diff --git a/docs/examples/employee-list/README.md b/docs/examples/employee-list/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a755455
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/examples/employee-list/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# employee-list — program B: attach, authenticate, read
+
+> **Status: target workload — does not compile on today's toolchain.**
+> Written ahead of iterations
+> [9c (cross-program tables)](../../stories/language-runtime-database/09c-cross-program-tables.md)
+> and [9d (keypair attach auth)](../../stories/language-runtime-database/09d-keypair-attach-auth.md),
+> the way every acceptance sample here precedes its features. It also leans
+> on 9/9b (the [employee sample](../employee/) it attaches to must run
+> first).
+
+Two programs, one database, one writer:
+
+```
+employee (A)                          employee-list (B)
+  owns WO_DATA + WAL                    no database of its own
+  [share] listen = unix:...sock         [connect.employee] ipc = unix:...sock
+  [[share.clients]]                     public_key = <A's fingerprint, pinned>
+    public_key = <B's fingerprint>      project    = ../employee  (shapes)
+    rights     = "read"
+        ▲                                     │
+        └── every statement executes here ◄───┘   (typed, over the wire)
+```
+
+The manifests are the design: **A grants, B pins.** A's `[share]` names B's
+public-key fingerprint with rights (`read` here); B's `[connect.employee]`
+names A's IPC string AND A's fingerprint, so neither side talks to an
+impostor. Fingerprints are printed by each program's `--identity` after
+first boot (keys are generated into `WO_DATA`, never written into a toml)
+and pasted — the `PASTE-…-HERE` placeholders mark exactly where. The
+connect-section name is the code's namespace: `[connect.employee]` is why
+the source says `employee.Employee`.
+
+| Mode | What it proves |
+| --- | --- |
+| `employee-list list` | typed reads over the wire, `e.dept.name` ref navigation executing inside A |
+| `employee-list report` | **byte-identical output to A's own `report`** — attach + GroupBy compose, the wire changes nothing |
+| `employee-list staff <dept>` | unique-name index probe + `staff` backlink scan, both in A |
+| `employee-list probe-write` | the rights matrix: registered read-only, so the insert traps with access-denied (caught, `DENIED …`, exit 4) and A's row count is unchanged |
+
+The 9d acceptance drives the rest from the outside: wrong key, no key,
+same-uid-wrong-key, impostor socket, handshake replay, key rotation — see
+the iteration's criteria; this sample is the workload they run against.
diff --git a/docs/examples/employee-list/main.wo b/docs/examples/employee-list/main.wo
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b08993c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/examples/employee-list/main.wo
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+-- employee-list — program B of the cross-program story (iterations 9c/9d).
+-- Attaches to the RUNNING employee program (A) named by [connect.employee]
+-- in wo.toml: keypair handshake first (9d), then typed statements over the
+-- wire (9c). A registered this program read-only, so every mode here reads —
+-- except probe-write, which exists to prove the rights matrix refuses.
+--
+-- The `employee.` prefix is the manifest's connect-section name: these are
+-- A's tables, checked against A's shapes at compile time and re-verified by
+-- the schema handshake at attach. A stays the single writer; every statement
+-- below executes inside A.
+
+fn main(args: multi Text) -> Int {
+  if len(args) >= 1 and args[0] == "list" { return list(); }
+  if len(args) >= 1 and args[0] == "report" { return report(); }
+  if len(args) >= 2 and args[0] == "staff" { return staff(args[1]); }
+  if len(args) >= 1 and args[0] == "probe-write" { return probe_write(); }
+  print_err("usage:");
+  print_err("  employee-list list             every employee, with department");
+  print_err("  employee-list report           aggregates by department (A's own report, over the wire)");
+  print_err("  employee-list staff <dept>     one department's staff");
+  print_err("  employee-list probe-write      prove read-only: the insert must be DENIED");
+  return 1;
+}
+
+-- Every employee with forward ref navigation — each `e.dept.name` is a
+-- point read executing inside A.
+fn list() -> Int {
+  for e in from x in employee.Employee order by x.name select x {
+    print("EMP ${e.name} ${e.salary} ${e.dept.name}");
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+-- Byte-identical output to A's own `employee report` — the 9c acceptance
+-- line: attach + query compose, and the wire changes nothing.
+fn report() -> Int {
+  let rows = from e in employee.Employee
+             group e by e.dept into g
+             order by avg(g.salary) desc
+             select { dept: g.key.name, headcount: count(g),
+                      avg_salary: avg(g.salary), min_salary: min(g.salary),
+                      max_salary: max(g.salary) };
+  for r in rows {
+    print("DEPT ${r.dept} headcount=${r.headcount} avg=${r.avg_salary} min=${r.min_salary} max=${r.max_salary}");
+  }
+  let payroll = sum(from e in employee.Employee select e.salary);
+  print("PAYROLL ${payroll}");
+  return 0;
+}
+
+-- Unique-name index probe + backlink scan, both executing in A.
+fn staff(name: Text) -> Int {
+  let ds = from d in employee.Department where d.name == name take 1 select d;
+  if len(ds) == 0 { print_err("no such department: ${name}"); return 1; }
+  for e in from s in ds[0].staff order by s.salary desc select s {
+    print("STAFF ${e.name} ${e.salary}");
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+-- The rights matrix, exercised: this program is registered READ-ONLY, so
+-- the insert must trap with the access-denied code — caught here, printed,
+-- and nothing was applied or WAL-logged in A (the acceptance asserts A's
+-- row count is unchanged).
+fn probe_write() -> Int {
+  let id = try insert employee.Department { name: "Intruders" } catch (e) nil;
+  if id == nil {
+    print("DENIED write to employee.Department (registered read-only)");
+    return 4;
+  }
+  print_err("UNEXPECTED: write succeeded with id ${id} — rights not enforced");
+  return 1;
+}
diff --git a/docs/examples/employee-list/wo.toml b/docs/examples/employee-list/wo.toml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..646ed57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/examples/employee-list/wo.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+name        = "employee-list"
+version     = "0.1.0"
+description = "Program B of the cross-program story: attaches read-only to the running employee program (A) over its IPC channel after keypair authentication, and lists/aggregates A's tables over the wire"
+
+[runtime]
+wo = ">= 0.1"
+
+[build]
+runtime = "../../../runtime/wovm"
+
+# Iteration 9c/9d surface (target — compiles once those land).
+# The section NAME is the namespace this program's code uses: [connect.employee]
+# makes A's tables reachable as `employee.Department` / `employee.Employee`.
+[connect.employee]
+# A's IPC string (9c fork 1: unix socket, listening beside A's WO_DATA;
+# A declares the same path in its [share] section).
+ipc = "unix:../employee/target/data/employee.sock"
+
+# A's PINNED public-key fingerprint (9d): B refuses to speak to anything on
+# that socket path that cannot sign A's challenge with this key — the
+# impostor-socket acceptance line. Printed by `employee --identity` after
+# A's first boot; paste it here. Never a private key, never a secret.
+public_key = "ed25519:PASTE-EMPLOYEE-FINGERPRINT-HERE"
+
+# Where B's compiler reads A's table shapes at compile time (9c fork 2's
+# milestone lean: project-directory reference). The runtime handshake
+# re-verifies the shapes against A's live class table at attach — a stale
+# checkout refuses the attachment with both shapes named.
+project = "../employee"
diff --git a/docs/examples/employee/wo.toml b/docs/examples/employee/wo.toml
index 2b8e567..6c2a151 100644
--- a/docs/examples/employee/wo.toml
+++ b/docs/examples/employee/wo.toml
@@ -10,3 +10,19 @@ wo = ">= 0.1"
 # toward, sample-first like log-watcher was.
 [build]
 runtime = "../../../runtime/wovm"
+
+# Iteration 9c/9d surface (target): this program OWNS its database and
+# shares it. The runtime listens on `listen` beside WO_DATA; every client
+# below is a grant — no registration, no attach, same uid included.
+[share]
+listen = "unix:target/data/employee.sock"
+
+# Program B (docs/examples/employee-list), granted read-only. Identity is
+# B's public-key fingerprint (9d): printed by `employee-list --identity`
+# after B's first boot; paste it here. Rights: "read" or "rw" — B's
+# probe-write mode exists to prove "read" refuses. Rotation and revocation
+# are edits to this table plus a restart, never an API.
+[[share.clients]]
+name       = "employee-list"
+public_key = "ed25519:PASTE-EMPLOYEE-LIST-FINGERPRINT-HERE"
+rights     = "read"
diff --git a/docs/stories/language-runtime-database/09c-cross-program-tables.md b/docs/stories/language-runtime-database/09c-cross-program-tables.md
index b18fea3..b840dc5 100644
--- a/docs/stories/language-runtime-database/09c-cross-program-tables.md
+++ b/docs/stories/language-runtime-database/09c-cross-program-tables.md
@@ -161,10 +161,10 @@ SIGTERM'd B parked on a channel read exits cleanly).
   doc's wire protocol, profiled for unix sockets, values in the WAL's
   encoding.
 - **The acceptance workload extends the employee sample**: A = the employee
-  program with `[share]`; B = a new thin `docs/examples/employee-report`
-  client attaching read-only for the GroupBy report, plus a read+write
-  audit-log writer path exercising the rights matrix and the refusal
-  traps. The sample stays the test.
+  program with `[share]`; B = `docs/examples/employee-list` (pre-authored
+  2026-08-15, sample-first — both manifests designed as a pair), attaching
+  read-only for the list/report/staff modes and proving the rights matrix
+  with its `probe-write` mode. The sample stays the test.
 - Depends on iterations 9 (engine, WAL — done through Task 3 as of
   2026-08-15) and 9b (typed statements and queries worth sharing); wants
   iteration 8's event loop for A's serving side but can prototype on a
diff --git a/docs/stories/language-runtime-database/09d-keypair-attach-auth.md b/docs/stories/language-runtime-database/09d-keypair-attach-auth.md
index 32dc470..139b55f 100644
--- a/docs/stories/language-runtime-database/09d-keypair-attach-auth.md
+++ b/docs/stories/language-runtime-database/09d-keypair-attach-auth.md
@@ -132,10 +132,13 @@ authorization input.
   9c without 9d ships a placeholder identity and 9d without 9c has nothing
   to authenticate. The 9c milestone may still land first with the uid
   bootstrap, flagged loudly as pre-9d.
-- **Acceptance extends the 9c workload**: the employee-A / report-B pair
-  gains the key exchange in both manifests; the acceptance script adds the
-  wrong-key, no-key, same-uid-wrong-key, replay, impostor-socket, and
-  rotation checks above, each asserting the exact trap/refusal.
+- **Acceptance extends the 9c workload**: the employee-A /
+  employee-list-B pair (`docs/examples/employee-list`, pre-authored
+  2026-08-15) carries the key exchange in both manifests — A's
+  `[[share.clients]]` names B's fingerprint, B's `[connect.employee]` pins
+  A's; the acceptance script adds the wrong-key, no-key,
+  same-uid-wrong-key, replay, impostor-socket, and rotation checks above,
+  each asserting the exact trap/refusal.
 - Expected shape: handshake module beside the channel code (both ends),
   `[share]`/`[connect]` manifest keys for fingerprints, first-boot keygen
   in the runtime's data-directory setup, vendored signature primitive with