docs(porch-store): spec for porch 1 store-backed middleware

- supersedes Phases B and C as built: a store-after-completion
  middleware cannot satisfy three of the story's seven criteria
- in-flight collision is undetectable (the row is written after the
  handler ran, so concurrent duplicates both miss and both execute)
- the 10s in-flight heuristic is inverted: created_at is stamped at
  store time, so it fires on legitimate fast replays and never on a
  genuinely concurrent request
- "reused key, different body is refused" is unreachable while the
  digest is folded into the key — nothing looks the bare key up
- design: sharded actor pool serializes per key, @table persists;
  actors own volatile state, tables own durability. Inherited by
  porch 2 and 3
- limiter joins the pool for exact counting, writes through instead of
  delete+insert, keys on net.peer unless trust_proxy is declared, and
  uses monotonic ticks for arithmetic but wall clock for the header
- idempotency blocks rather than answering 409: call parks the
  duplicate until the owner reports. Digest becomes a column
- saturation fails closed with 503 for both: saturating the pool must
  not become the limiter bypass
- records that the story's "time.after is still reserved" is stale;
  spawn/send/call/monitor/time.after all landed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit fc09e94373db65837ff5eb620fec67bab02c1931)
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# porch 1 — store-backed middleware: rate limiting and idempotency
Design settled 2026-08-29. Implements
[porch 1](../../stories/porch/01-store-backed-middleware.md).
## Why this is a redesign, not a first draft
Phases A, B and C already have code on `dev` — `519d411`, `5b1e82a`, `aee7926`.
Phase A survives. **Phases B and C are superseded**, because both are built
around a middleware that stores its result *after* the handler returns, and
three of the story's seven acceptance criteria cannot be satisfied by that
shape:
- **In-flight collision is undetectable.** The `before` hook finds nothing and
passes; the row is written by `after`, once the handler has already run. Two
concurrent duplicates both miss and both execute. There is no reservation for
them to collide on.
- **The in-flight heuristic is inverted.** It treats a row younger than ten
seconds as "in flight", but the timestamp is stamped when the response is
*stored*, not when the request *starts*. So it fires on a legitimate fast
replay — the common case — answering 409 where the stored response was owed,
and it can never fire on a genuinely concurrent request.
- **"Reused key, different body is refused" is unreachable by construction.**
The body digest is folded into the lookup key, so a different body is a
different key and simply misses. That is safe — the wrong response is never
served — but nothing ever looks the bare key up, so nothing can refuse.
Two further defects, independent of the redesign: the limiter emits a monotonic
tick value into `X-RateLimit-Reset`, where clients expect a Unix timestamp; and
its key selection branches on a request-context flag that nothing anywhere
sets, so the branch is dead.
## The shape
One idea, inherited by porch 2 (sessions) and 3 (CSRF):
> **Serialize through an actor. Persist in a `@table`. Never read-modify-write
> from a handler fiber.**
A read-modify-write from a handler fiber is the defect both features share. The
limiter reads a count, adds one, and writes it back; two fibers interleaved lose
an increment, and a limiter that under-counts fails at precisely the moment it
exists for. Idempotency has the same race with worse consequences. An actor
processes one message at a time, so routing both features through one gives
per-key serialization with no locks and no polling.
Actors own **serialization and volatile state**. Tables own **durability**.
No middleware touches those tables directly.
### The pool
A fixed pool of `N` identical actors, selected by a hash of the key modulo `N`.
The same key therefore always reaches the same actor, which is the whole
mechanism — ordering is only needed *per key*, never globally, and a pool buys
concurrency across keys while a single actor would serialize the entire
program's traffic through one mailbox.
`N` is a declared capacity knob, documented and set at construction. It is the
one number in this design that a deployment may need to change.
### Why the primitives are already there
The story states that nothing here needs a new runtime primitive, and then that
`time.after` is "still a reserved builtin id". The second claim is stale and the
first is still true. All of it landed with the actor-lifecycle work: `spawn`
(68), `send` (69), `call` (88 — a send that waits, whose park/reply protocol
lives in the VM), `monitor` (89), and `time.after` (90). `call` parking the
caller until a reply arrives is exactly the blocking primitive this design
needs, and it already exists.
## Phase A — the store convention
Two purpose-shaped tables, as already built and as the story's first fork
leaned. A counter row is an integer; a stored response is a status, a header
set and a body. A single generic table would force both through text, which is
how framework caches end up storing JSON strings for want of a column.
The stored-response table gains **one new column: the request digest**, stored
beside the response rather than folded into the key. That single change is what
makes refusal possible.
Expiry stays lazy — pruned when a key is next touched, never by a sweeper. The
story is right that porch has no scheduler, and `time.after` is a one-shot timer
aimed at an actor, not a recurring sweep.
## Phase B — the rate limiter
Every request calls its pool actor and waits for a verdict. The actor reads the
counter, decides, writes the new count, and replies with the decision plus the
numbers the response headers need.
Three corrections to what exists:
- **Write through, do not delete and re-insert.** Assigning to a field of a
table row compiles to an engine update that maintains the row's indexes at the
choke point. Delete-then-insert writes two WAL records where one will do, and
leaves a window in which the delete has landed and the insert has not — which,
with the failure swallowed as it currently is, silently loses the counter
entirely and hands the client a free window. That is the exact inverse of the
durability this iteration exists to demonstrate.
- **Key on the peer address by default.** The limiter takes a trust-proxy flag
defaulting to off. Off, it keys on the connection's real peer, which cannot be
forged. On, it keys on the left-most forwarded-for entry, and the application
author is asserting that a proxy they control overwrites that header. Only the
deployer knows the topology, so the declaration belongs in their code — not in
a context flag nothing sets. When story 35 lands a peer-address seam that can
*verify* the proxy, it can downgrade a trust-proxy claim that is untrue.
- **Two clocks, deliberately.** Window arithmetic uses the monotonic tick source
so that a wall-clock jump cannot grant an extra window. The reset header must
carry wall-clock time, because it is for a client that has no access to this
process's boot time.
Persisting every increment is one WAL record per request. Group commit batches a
drain into a single barrier, so the cost is amortised rather than a sync per
request — and paying it is what makes the restart criterion true.
## Phase C — idempotency
A keyed request calls its pool actor and receives one of three outcomes.
| Actor state for that key | Reply | Caller does |
| --- | --- | --- |
| A stored response exists, digest matches | the stored response | returns it; handler never runs |
| A stored response exists, digest differs | a refusal verdict | answers 422 |
| No record, no owner | ownership | runs the handler, then reports the result back |
| An owner is already running | *nothing yet* | stays parked until the owner reports |
The fourth row is the design. The actor does not answer a duplicate while an
owner holds the key; it records that someone is waiting and replies to every
waiter once the owner reports its result. Because `call` already parks the
caller, waiting costs a parked fiber and no polling. There is no 409, and no
timestamp heuristic.
The lookup key is the **bare** idempotency key. The digest of method, path and
body is a column, compared on a hit. Equal means a genuine retry and earns the
stored response; different means the key was reused for a different request, and
that is refused rather than answered with another request's response.
Replay carries `content-type` only. The story's third fork is settled as built,
and settled correctly: replaying a stored `Set-Cookie` or a stale `Date` is
wrong, and porch has no cookies yet, so this is cheap now and expensive after
iteration 2.
## Failure semantics
**Saturation fails closed.** Mailboxes are bounded, so a burst can trap. Both
features answer 503 with a retry hint rather than proceeding. A rate limiter
that stops limiting under load is worse than absent, because saturating the pool
*becomes* the bypass — and a burst is the thing it exists to stop. The cost is
honest and must be documented: a genuine traffic spike degrades to 503 once the
pool is full, which makes the pool size a real capacity decision rather than a
default nobody reads.
**A crash loses only volatile state.** Counters and stored responses are in the
WAL and replay. Ownership and waiter lists are in-memory and do not. A crash
mid-handler therefore leaves no owner, and the next duplicate re-runs the
handler — the behaviour the world had before the feature existed, rather than a
key wedged permanently pending. This is the decisive advantage over persisting
reservations: a durable pending row outlives the process that owned it and must
then be rescued by a lease, whose expiry is another number to get wrong.
## Phase D — the gate
The story is right that a durability claim no gate exercises is not a claim, and
the restart leg is the one most likely to be quietly skipped. The acceptance
script gains: a burst that crosses the threshold exactly; a restart between two
bursts proving counters replayed rather than reset; a replayed key proving the
handler's side effect count is unchanged, counted from a row count rather than a
log line; a reused key with a different body earning a refusal; and two
simultaneous duplicates proving exactly one execution.
The concurrency legs need genuine parallelism, not two sequential requests. A
test that cannot fail before the fix is not a test.
## Acceptance criteria
Carried from the story, with the three unreachable ones restated to match the
design that replaces them.
- **Given** a limiter of N per window, **when** a client sends N+1, **then** the
first N succeed and the last is refused with a retry hint.
- **Given** counters at their limit, **when** the process is terminated and
restarted, **then** the client is still limited — replayed from the WAL, not
reset.
- **Given** a fully elapsed window, **when** the client returns, **then** it is
served and the expired row is pruned on that access.
- **Given** the system clock jumping backwards, **when** a window is evaluated,
**then** no extra allowance is granted.
- **Given** N concurrent requests for one key, **when** they are counted,
**then** the total is exactly N — no increment is lost. *(Newly reachable;
the pool is what makes it true.)*
- **Given** a seen idempotency key, **when** it is replayed, **then** the stored
response is returned byte-identically and the side-effect count is unchanged,
proven by a row count.
- **Given** a reused key with a different body, **when** it arrives, **then** it
is refused. *(Newly reachable; the digest column is what makes it true.)*
- **Given** two identical keyed requests in flight at once, **when** both are
dispatched, **then** exactly one executes and the other receives that one's
stored response — never a refusal, never a partial write. *(Restated: the
story allowed 409 here; blocking supersedes it.)*
- **Given** a saturated pool, **when** a request arrives, **then** it is refused
with 503 rather than served uncounted.
## Out of scope
Unchanged from the story: no pluggable storage interface, no sliding-window or
token-bucket algorithm, no cross-process limiting, no background sweeper, and no
TTL cache — language iteration 18 owns that and its spec is already approved.
Added: **verifying** that a peer really is the trusted proxy. This design lets an
author declare it; story 35 owns proving it.
## Risks
- **The pool is now on every request path.** Exact counting was chosen over a
free hot path deliberately, but it makes pool sizing a first-class operational
concern, and the fail-closed rule converts undersizing into 503s rather than
into silent overshoot. That trade is the point, and it needs to be measured
before it is defended.
- **A parked duplicate waits as long as its owner runs.** A slow handler holds
its waiters. No deadline is specified here; if one proves necessary it belongs
with the measurement, not ahead of it.