- catch (e) nil could not distinguish a real store failure (e.g. a
mod-by-zero from Pool { actors: [] }) from ordinary saturation
- print_err the trap message before answering 503, matching the same
fix in idempotent.wo's pool_begin catch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit c53ad583051abeeeb302301fc3d91073f0a15fcc)
- stored/replayed headers widen from content-type only to an allowlist
(content-type, location, etag, cache-control), matched case-insensitively
-- a redirect() lost its Location on its own first response, not just replay
- add pool_slots(Pool) -> multi PoolSlot and pool_of(multi PoolSlot) -> Pool
- Pool is demand-promoted to traced (WO-E222) and can't live in actor
state; PoolSlot/multi PoolSlot never is, the same shape chat/main.wo's
Room already holds directly -- this is what lets an app actually shard
across N actors per connection instead of a forced one-slot pool
- log a genuine pool_select trap instead of silently folding it into 503
- fix stale comments: the prune below IS a delete-then-insert (of a
fresh row, not the same one) contradicting the doc comment above it;
the catch shape referenced in two comments had changed
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit b738269314f01a95dee1341437c7661ce9e28730)
- normalise self.key_header via to_lower before the req.headers lookup
- req.headers keys are already lowercased on read (internal/parse.wo);
the documented key_header: "Idempotency-Key" never matched, silently
disabling idempotency (falls through to inner.handle) on every request
- key/digest lookups use the normalised name consistently
- digest now always includes method+path, body appended only when
include_body is set -- a bare "" digest under include_body:false
previously matched any other request reusing the same key
- log a genuine pool_begin trap instead of silently folding it into 503
- update the two doc comments describing the old, unsafe shape
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 91099cfbb2fb9a2d351894e444fed306b25557d5)
- Add saturation leg (scripts/web-app-accept.sh): one-actor pool,
WO_MAILBOX=2, 15 concurrent requests, exactly 3 served + 12 answer
503; execution count matches the 200 count, retry-after + real
cause verified on the 503s
- Guard make_pool(n<1) by clamping in make_pool itself, not
pool_select's division -- that trap runs inside the middleware's
own try/catch and would be swallowed as ordinary saturation forever
- README: rate limiting + idempotency ledger rows moved to done,
scoped to what the gate proves; documented Handler-decorator
shape, Pool aliasing (WO-E222), call's scalar-only reply (WO-E226),
pool size as a capacity decision
- Story: Progress table filled with real hashes, 7/9 acceptance
criteria marked verified with citations, 2 marked verified by
construction (never gated even in the original plan), status: done
- Status board: standup entry, porch 1 pending row updated
- Recorded a pre-existing runtime hang (main() returns cleanly, OS
process sometimes hangs under concurrent call()-parked callers)
that also reaches the new leg's teardown; contained with kill -9
rather than asserted, so it can't flake the leg's actual subject
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 21934b18910070a3f24b8bd4367fcb9d397dc1fb)
- The nonce naming an ephemeral (4xx/5xx) row is handed to exactly one
call() reply and nowhere else -- no other message can ever construct
that key, so idempotent.wo deleting it right after building the Resp
is safe by construction (unlike the earlier shared bare-key row,
which a second message COULD reach and made deleting it racy)
- Closes the leak AND a real correctness edge: the nonce is
time.ticks() % 1_000_000_000, wrapping every ~1000s -- with rows kept
forever, a later failed attempt on the same key could land on the
same nonce and either collide with the unguarded insert or resurface
a stale replay, exactly what rounds 1/2 removed
- Gate leg 18f: N ephemeral attempts against the same key must return
IdempotencyKey's row count to baseline, not grow it by N -- confirmed
failing (baseline+N) against the pre-fix code, passing after
- N picked at 3: the pre-existing runtime hang/segfault (out of scope,
being tracked separately) reproduces more often at higher sequential
insert+delete volume against the same key; 3 stayed clean across
many runs while still proving the property precisely
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9ad594748e01a665ccaf29733a48c2b83a2749da)
- Root cause of the residual: a 4xx/5xx row lived under the bare key,
so a second message could delete-and-replace it before the FIRST
caller's own middleware-side read (necessarily outside receive,
WO-E226) ever ran -- the owner itself could read back a LATER
message's answer, not just a duplicate reading a stale one
- Fix: a 4xx/5xx miss is never stored under the bare key at all. Each
such attempt gets its own row, keyed by a nonce carried back in the
scalar reply's low digits, so no other message for the same bare key
ever touches it -- the decision AND the row's identity are both
fixed inside the one serialized receive call
- Disclosed trade-off: that row is never revisited by a bare-key
lookup, so it is never TTL-pruned either -- permanent per failed
attempt, the same no-sweeper trade-off this codebase already makes
elsewhere, not a new one
- Gate leg 18e: reran 20x in isolation against the fix with zero
500-500 or 200-200 outcomes (was reproducible before)
- §18's SIGTERM-stop check now force-kills on timeout before clearing
$SRV, instead of matching §14/§17b's own gap where a still-running
process escapes the exit trap too -- an orphan no longer survives
past this leg regardless of the assertion's own outcome
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 464147a9ddf3a53cb1946637c3f517ba615ee358)
- Miss path only marks a response a durable replay target (outcome 1)
when status is 2xx/3xx; a 4xx/5xx gets outcome 3 instead
- Outcome 3's row is a one-shot relay: the scalar reply still can't carry
a Resp (WO-E226), so the row exists only to hand the exact response
back once, then idempotent.wo deletes it -- a retry with the same key
is a genuine miss and re-executes, instead of caching a 500 for the
24h default TTL
- Reviewer finding: caching any status meant a transient failure was
replayed verbatim until TTL expiry, worse than no idempotency at all
- Gate leg 18d: FlakyHandler fails once then succeeds; same key twice
must answer 500 then 200 -- confirmed failing (500, 500) before the
fix, passing after
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit e61015f2065a7c6aec6f5c2439e78b53f796bab3)
- Delete before/after flow: it stored on a miss, so two duplicates both
missed and both ran; its 10s "in flight" check fired on fast legit
replays and never on a real collision
- Idempotent now wraps the route's Handler and hands request + handler to
the pool; a duplicate waits in the actor's mailbox, not a held reply
- keypool.wo kind-2 arm: digest match replays, mismatch refuses (422), a
miss runs the handler inside receive and stores status/body/
content-type, all via the same pool_pack(count, remaining_ms) scalar
kind-1 uses (WO-E226 forces one return type)
- Outcome codes start at 1, never 0: idempotent.wo's try/catch cannot
tell a literal 0 reply apart from a trapped call
- fresh_req() copies a borrowed Req's map fields into a new Req before it
crosses the actor boundary (WO-E222: aliased graphs can't cross heaps)
- Reading a stored row back forces fresh Text via `.. ""` on every field
copied out of json.decode's result -- decoded Text does not survive
being handed onward once the decoded record goes out of scope
- insert is unguarded (kind 1's own convention): a swallowed failure
would answer "stored" for a response never written
- web-app-accept.sh: leg 18a/b/c -- byte-identical replay off an ExecMark
row count, digest mismatch is 422, genuinely parallel duplicates run
the handler exactly once
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit eae1b06cdc38e4766d4e27a66b02264f47164e99)
- limiter_key: an empty client_ip(req) under trust_proxy no longer keys
on the literal "ip:" -- falls through to net.peer(req.conn) instead,
same as the untrusted-default path
- the bug: every client omitting X-Forwarded-For shared ONE bucket,
so one could exhaust it and deny/hide the rest
- curl availability check added alongside the existing woc/wovm check
(the limiter gate legs drive the server with it)
- new gate leg: LIMIT+1 sequential no-XFF requests must all be 200
(own key per connection, via a fresh ephemeral port each time) --
confirmed it fails against the pre-fix code (6th comes back 429)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 831e9d8e6b1ef39cd938783dbc47c1abe6d53211)
- delete all RateLimitCounter access from limiter.wo: query, increment,
delete-then-insert, and the swallowing catch (e) nil -- the pool is now
the only writer, so its serialization guarantee actually holds
- Limiter gains pool/limit/trust_proxy fields; before() calls pool_count
and acts on the Verdict; make_limiter takes a pool
- key selection: req.principal first, else trust_proxy ? client_ip(req)
: net.peer(req.conn); delete the dead req.ctx["verified_proxy"] branch
- 429 on a spent window (Retry-After, X-RateLimit-*); 503 + Retry-After
on a caught actor trap (saturated pool), request never let through
- add Limiter.after(), registered alongside before() as both Mw and Aw
(Cors's own shape) so the allowed path's X-RateLimit-* headers reach
the response, not just req.ctx
- scripts/web-app-accept.sh: three new gate legs -- threshold (N pass,
N+1th 429), SIGTERM+restart (still limited from the WAL), and N
genuinely-parallel curl clients on one key with an exact-count assertion
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit a653dd0aa64711c43461126d32b4632cc8f64c7a)
- keypool.wo:78,89 passed msg.window (µs) straight into pool_pack's
remaining_ms (ms) parameter on the first-hit and post-prune-reset
paths; the third call site already divided by 1000 and was correct
- fix: pool_pack(1, msg.window / 1000) at both sites — a 60s window
no longer reports reset_at ~16.7h away
- count/allowed were unaffected (computed independently); this only
hit the client-visible reset instant, on the two most common cases
(new key, window rollover)
- extended gate leg 16 to assert reset_at falls within a 5s band of
time.now() + window_ms, not just on count — verified the assertion
itself by reverting the fix, confirming leg 16 failed with the
exact defect shape, then restoring it and confirming green
- woc docs/examples/porch/ exits 0; web-app-accept.sh: 47 checks,
0 failures
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 153fd295d37905dd083823536c6781843699e455)
- add docs/examples/porch/middleware/keypool.wo: one PoolMsg (kind 1 =
count, kind 2 = begin placeholder for task 4), a Verdict class, a
fixed-size actor pool with a byte-sum-mod-N selector
- KeyActor.receive implements kind 1: reads the row, writes the new
count via field assignment (writes through, never delete+insert),
prunes a fully-elapsed window's row instead of resetting it
- window arithmetic on time.ticks(); reset instant sent back is built
from time.now() only
- call's reply must be a copyable scalar (WO-E226), so the count and
remaining window time are packed into one Int by the actor and
unpacked into Verdict by pool_count — the packing stays inside this
file, callers only ever see Verdict
- gate leg in scripts/web-app-accept.sh: a flat copy of porch (manifest
stripped) with a driver dropped beside keypool.wo asserts two
sequential counts return 1 then 2; verified failing (E403, make_pool
undeclared) before this file existed, passing after
- woc docs/examples/porch/ exits 0; full web-app-accept.sh: 47 checks,
0 failures
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 676e651d808ef2c3619f88c3808adc372cd0be6c)
- Add digest field to store sha256(method|path|body) separately from key
- Enables detection of "same key, different body" in future tasks
- Update idempotent.wo insert to compute and store digest value
- Typechecker passes: exit 0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3a9bddcd1e3c11f5b371ce54cafc373685ca08b6)
- docs/examples/porch/ did not typecheck: WO-E403 "cannot resolve the
receiver's type for the call to `encode`" on json.encode
- every other example that calls json.encode/decode imports it; this
file did not, so the whole porch library was uncompilable on dev
- woc docs/examples/porch/ now exits 0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5c3544d524fa98dbb7a363600cd2eeb6dd1badac)
- replays a stored response for a repeated Idempotency-Key: before()
checks the key, after() stores status/body/content-type on a 2xx/3xx
- key is "idem:<header>:<value>", optionally plus a sha256 digest of
method|path|body when include_body is set
- 409 while a key is in flight (stored within the last 10s), lazy TTL
expiry on access, default 24h
- replay allowlists content-type only — never Set-Cookie or Date
- backed by IdempotencyKey from Phase A (519d411)
Written by a parallel session and committed here as-is because its
branch was consolidated away. NOT verified: it calls json.decode and
json.encode without a `use json` import, which every other example that
uses json has. Left unedited rather than fixed blind.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit aee79264095eea3b2c38c92789c44b31f1c9ef8a)
