- docs/plan/oop-vm/04-db-binding.md, WAL section, "Where the log lives":
WO_DATA is always a path; directory form (existing dir or trailing `/`
→ `<dir>/shard-0.wal`, pre-7 bytes incl. the `//`), file form (the path
IS the log, created only under an existing parent), the two refusal
lines verbatim, too-long refused not truncated, one file at any core
count, compaction/migration temps + parent fsync derived from the log
path never from WO_DATA, the two pinning tests named.
- database/src/CODE-LOGIC.md, `wal.c — durability`: the resolver's three
codes and main.c's wording, why no mkdir -p, trailing slash on a missing
dir kept as the pre-7 `cannot open` on purpose, `parent_dir_of` shared
by the boot check and the post-rename fsync.
- Both paragraphs sit in regions untouched by the uncommitted 6a/12 doc
work in the same files; no other docs touched (story/board are pm's).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit f1985bae5d110ed773159393bd82c32b73bfb672)
- `wo_wal_resolve_data_path` (database/src/wal.c|h): an existing directory
or a trailing `/` → `<dir>/shard-0.wal` byte for byte (the `//` after a
trailing slash included); otherwise the path IS the log — opened if a
regular file, created by `wo_wal_open` if absent under an existing parent.
- Refusals as codes for main.c: WO_WAL_PATH_NO_PARENT (out = the parent, so
the line names it), WO_WAL_PATH_NOT_A_FILE (fifo/socket/device),
WO_WAL_PATH_TOO_LONG (today's snprintf truncated silently).
- `parent_dir_of` shared by the resolver and `sync_parent_dir`: the parent
checked at boot IS the parent fsync'd after a compaction/migration rename.
- runtime/src/main.c: the resolver replaces the unconditional
`"%s/shard-0.wal"`; each refusal is one stderr line, exit 2 through the
6a destroy sequence; never mkdir -p. The 6a block is untouched.
- Failing first: test_resolve_data_path — 4× -Werror (implicit declaration
+ three undeclared codes); green after: 21 assertions (dir, trailing
slash, absent file, regular file, bare name, missing parent, parent is a
file, fifo, two too-long).
- `make -C runtime test`: 21 suites, 8374 pass / 0 fail (was 8353/0).
`make -C runtime wovm-asan` clean; smoke: file form seeds + replays with
`app.db` the only artifact; missing parent and fifo refuse rc 2 naming
path + parent; dir and trailing slash unchanged; WO_EPHEMERAL conflict
inherited from 6a.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit b31bd4052624be460de1c18cf208661539397e09)
- crash-before-rename test: a COMPLETE valid migrated temp beside the
untouched original is discarded and the boot re-migrates — the
sharpest point on the crash timeline, deterministic, no fault
injection needed
- story: all six tasks done with commit hashes, all eight criteria met
with the test that proves each, plus the three deviations from the
plan and why (transcode over replay, lazy head, poison forces
transcode)
- CODE-LOGIC: migration section; also corrected limitation 3, which
still claimed unbounded hot-row chains — iteration 11 closed that
- status board row 12; deploy guide's rollback section gets its real
answer (rolling back across a migration is a migration backwards:
expect the refusal, restore the .bak)
- test_wal 5966 pass, 0 fail
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4bb6ece2531e2123eb958c91d9bef4a6528eab3b)
- main.c builds the compiled schema (names out of the constant pool,
which the database layer never sees), peeks the log head before
replay, and diffs: match replays as-is, add/delete migrates through
the transcode, poisons refuse naming class, field and what to do
- fixed en route: a poisoned class SKIPPED the identity check, so no
transcode ran and replay greeted the shape mismatch with the generic
"corruption" — the exact message this iteration exists to replace.
A poison now forces the transcode, where it either bites with its
text or passes harmlessly when the class has no records
- the schema head is written LAZILY, ahead of the first real record:
an eager head broke the documented "durable: false writes ZERO
bytes" contract by 75 bytes and the residency gate caught it
- end-to-end at the language level: fresh boot seeds, identity
replays, +field migrates with "migrating `Note`: +flag" and reads 0,
retype refuses naming `val`, and the refused log still boots the
previous binary untouched
- gates: wovm-test all green (test_wal 5951/0), woc-test clean,
residency-accept 14/0, site-accept 23/0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit b21943aa91152ebdcfc72bd4c9fba38730ab1c2f)
- wo_wal_migrate rewrites the log without touching db state: no id
maps, no indexes, no keys-resident logic — the new log replays
through the machinery that already exists and is already tested
- cids remap by name, INCLUDING the ones embedded inside stored owned
values (an owned value carries a cid on the wire); the embed closure
guarantees every nested class is shape-unchanged, so only numbers
move
- surviving fields go to their new slot, deleted fields' values are
freed, added fields take the kind's zero value straight from
enc_val(0)
- a delta on a deleted field is SPLICED out: an offset map (old record
start -> new) rewrites every back pointer, and the dropped delta maps
to its own target so later deltas step over it
- temp + fsync + rename, compaction's own crash discipline; a stale
temp is discarded at start; a torn tail bounds the intact prefix
exactly as replay does
- fixed en route: early `goto corrupt` jumped over initializers, so the
handler freed uninitialized memory — declarations hoisted above the
first jump
- six end-to-end tests: add, delete (ASan watches the freed Text),
reorder with owned fixup, delta splice on a keys-resident chain,
poison-bites-only-with-records, corrupt input
- test_wal 5951 pass, 0 fail
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit b69092a99206e1dcdf6f2dcdb02146939b0564c6)
- wo_schema_diff matches classes and fields by NAME, so declaration
reordering is identity apart from the cid map — the silent
cid-renumbering hole closes as a side effect
- owned-field references (fclass) compare by the NAME the number
resolves to, never the number: a raw compare would false-poison
retype on every pure reorder
- refusals are per-class POISONS carried in the plan, not diff errors:
a poison bites only when a record of the class is met, so a retyped
class with no stored rows never blocks a boot
- poison set: retype, same-shape delete+add (a disguised rename, one
reading destroys a column), vanished class, storage-flag change, and
the embed closure — any class whose old records carry values of a
class whose shape changed, iterated to a fixpoint
- identity plans skip the rewrite entirely; a NEW class in the binary
does not break identity (no records; the head refreshes at the next
compaction)
- ten verdict tests; test_wal 5778 pass, 0 fail
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 63a063b822af381a10c2e599c58cf3455d9c5bf7)
- new record kind 5: class and field NAMES, kinds and the two
encoding-relevant metadata words (field_class, field_elem), CRC-framed
like every record. Index layout deliberately absent: indexes rebuild
from rows at boot and never touch record bytes
- names are byte pointers, not constant-pool indices — the database
layer never sees the module's consts, so the runtime resolves them
once; a decoded schema owns a private copy of its bytes
- wo_wal_set_schema adopts the compiled schema; wo_wal_ensure_schema
writes it as a fresh log's first record; compaction writes it at the
head of every replacement, which is how a legacy log becomes
self-describing without a migration step of its own
- apply_record skips it BEFORE reading cid/id (its class count would be
misread as a cid and bounds-refused); replay does not count it
- schema unset = byte-for-byte today's behaviour: all 5700 prior
assertions pass untouched; four new tests cover roundtrip, fresh-log
head, legacy adoption via compaction, and absent/empty files
- test_wal 5743 pass, 0 fail
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit ba8519fa5e39c6ed6a3504d39e5a372f8decd045)
- flattened row image is WO_WAL_UPDATE, not WO_WAL_INSERT: the row's
original INSERT is already in a live log, so a second one for the same
id is a duplicate replay refuses as corruption. INSERT is right only
for compaction, which builds a fresh log
- remove WO_CKPT_MAX_GARBAGE: with the absolute term at 64 MiB, garbage
large enough to reach a 256 MiB ceiling has already tripped it, so the
branch was unreachable. Postgres needs both constants because it
thresholds on tuples with its pair at opposite ends; this thresholds
on bytes, where one constant does both jobs
- test_delta_chain_flattens_at_k: chain depth stays <= WO_DELTA_MAX_HOPS
across 2K+2 updates, and a reset is observed
- test_delta_chain_flatten_replays: a flattened chain replays correctly
- test_keys_resident_indexed_across_flatten: a delta on an indexed
column composes with flattening, checked at every step across the
bound and after restart. Found no product defect
- test_should_compact_absolute_and_ceiling: pins the absolute term, the
boundary just under it, and the small-log case the ratio still governs
- test_wal 5700 pass / 0 fail; wovm-test and woc-test green
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit f93b5d9db753305c297e868d977670e6d703684c)
TESTS DELIBERATELY HELD at the developer's instruction — logic only.
The existing suite passes (36 suites, 0 fail) but exercises NEITHER new
behaviour: nothing builds a 16-deep chain, and no checkpoint test uses a
log near 64 MiB. Green here means "did not break what existed".
- tier 1: wo_wal_fold_row_at gains hops_out. The walk already visits
every hop, so the depth is free — this is the design's pd_prune_xid,
a cheap "is work worth doing" hint taken from work already happening
- the update path branches on it: past WO_DELTA_MAX_HOPS (16) it writes
a full-row image instead of a delta, terminating the chain. `r`
already holds the complete post-update row because index maintenance
required folding it, so flattening costs bytes, not an extra read
- wo_wal_append_row_image encodes from a caller-held row, as
WO_WAL_INSERT: a chain's base must replay into a database where
nothing precedes it, so replay/compaction/fold need no change
- tier 2: should_compact gains a TRIGGERING absolute term and a ceiling.
Our `floor` SUPPRESSES on a small log — the opposite of postgres's
vac_base_thresh, which triggers on a small absolute problem the
proportion hides. We had the proportion and the suppressor and
neither real guard
- verified by construction, not test: both update entry points converge
on row_apply_field_keys; db.c captures next_offset BEFORE calling in,
so the re-point is transparent to which record type was written
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1b808abd5942de81c3a6416714d1302384103040)
- wo_wal_pend_repoint's failure was silently discarded (db.c); its
own doc claimed replay reconciles a stale map — false, a second
same-drain update chains past the lost one, permanently. Now
fatal, like wo_wal_stage_fatal; comment corrected
- apply_delta dereferenced db->rt->wal unguarded — NULL rt + any
DELTA record was a crash. Now refuses cleanly (-1)
- wo_wal_replay_ex lent its throwaway view only when rt->wal was
unset, so a live wal's non-empty staging buffer could be folded
against during replay. Now installs unconditionally whenever rt
exists, saving/restoring whatever was there
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit fed9fe8b5fe022f0b22a4170c7fd68008700939f)
- wo_row_borrow's keys arm folded at hget()'s DURABLE offset even
when an earlier update in the same drain had only a PENDING
re-point
- idx_remove_row then hashed the pre-first-update value, found no
matching bucket entry (already moved by the earlier update), and
idx_add_row added a second one — N same-drain updates leaked N-1
entries, unbounded, nothing reclaims them but a restart
- now prefers wo_wal_repoint_offset1() over the durable offset, same
as back_off already does, closing it for every borrow
- new test: 5 updates to one row in one drain, assert exactly one
index entry — fails (5) before the fix, passes (1) after
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit d4b12d1908e574419c7af2411e52d02623f7e5b7)
- loader.c: delete the INCOMPLETE-update BAIL; durable:false +
resident:keys stays refused (nowhere to read from)
- table.c: root-cause fix for the Text-index gap — a keys-resident
borrow now holds ENGINE values, matching wo_row_ptr's contract
(table.h's "no VM pointer" doctrine), not a VM-decoded row. Fixes
idx_hash/idx_cols_equal/wo_idx_probe AND db.c's GET_FIELD/PROBE
arms with one change; reproduced pre-fix as an ASan
heap-buffer-overflow
- docs/examples/residency: Product is genuinely resident:keys;
residency-accept.sh's refusal leg replaced by proving the program
runs and stock survives a restart (11/0)
- test_wal.c: oracle test drives resident:all and resident:keys
through the same update sequence and asserts identical rows;
Text-indexed-update test catches the representation bug; five
pre-existing tests corrected to the fixed contract (4746/0)
- story, README, status board, CODE-LOGIC.md updated; three known
limitations documented: mid-drain stale reads, O(N^2) replay in
chain length, compaction blind to per-row chain length
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit b87c68f950f01aa5e572fbb86a0f374adc83d813)
- apply_delta: DELTA replay arm — fold pre-delta state via back_off,
overlay the field, remove-then-recreate so indexes stay correct
- apply_record/replay loop: dispatch DELTA to apply_delta, drop its
payload back to the log same as INSERT/UPDATE
- stage_flattened_row: compaction's delta-chain path — fold + re-encode
as one fresh INSERT instead of copying the chain
- wo_wal_compact: peek the row's current record kind, flatten deltas,
keep the byte-for-byte copy for chains already at length zero
- test_wal: three new tests — chain-of-three replay incl. secondary
index, compaction flattens to chain length zero (asserts the record
is a full row, not a delta), and the commit-before-repoint crash
window replays the update without ever re-pointing the map
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7e4ae70d7beb2a2e396a002184bc06f41253decb)
- table.c: unique shadow-check's candidate lookup now checks
wo_wal_repoint_offset1 before the durable wo_row_offset1, same as
back_off — a candidate updated earlier in the SAME uncommitted drain
was folded from its stale pre-update offset, letting a real @unique
clash through and committing a duplicate
- the offset-only substitution alone was NOT enough (verified): the
candidate must be FOLDED to compare values, and folding a pending
offset via pread saw "no record" (bytes still only in the staging
buffer), so the clash was still missed, just for a different reason
- wal.c: wo_wal_fold_row_at now reads a hop inside the currently-staged
region from `w->buf` (new scan_record_staged, scan_record's framing
over memory) instead of pread; every durable hop, and every existing
caller, is unchanged
- test_wal.c: two updates in one drain where the second collides with
the first's new unique value; must be refused. Verified failing
against the prior commit, and still failing with only the offset
substitution, before the fold fix; passing with both in place
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit c049ab92570cfba4d12a018884a20b25a8916727)
- db.c: guard both WO_B_DB_UPDATE_FIELD arms on keys-resident tables —
wo_wal_append_update read a NULL wo_row_ptr there; a live crash, fixed
- ruling override on Task 3: row_apply_field_keys no longer commits or
moves the id map — stages the delta, does the index swap (RAM apply,
unconditional past the shadow-check; a stage failure past that point
is now fatal, like insert). Commit/re-point move to the caller,
mirroring insert. table.c's WAL commit removal is this ruling, not a
regression
- offset passed back via caller-side wo_wal_next_offset(), insert's
koff pattern
- inline arm commits then re-points; request arm records
wo_wal_pend_repoint (own list/name — a drop and a re-point differ),
flushed by wo_db_flush_drops after the barrier
- back_off checks the pending re-point before the durable offset, else
a second update in one drain skips the first delta; verified failing
this way, passing after
- wal.c: fixed a stale comment — keys-resident updates CAN reach
wo_wal_append_update's caller now, they just never call it
- test_wal.c: 2 tests updated for the new contract; new test drives 2
same-row updates via wo_row_update_field_slot in one uncommitted
"drain", checks the value and delta 2's on-disk back-pointer
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4d13bcebfe51936ba8c608dd9e791c784e5b8983)
- row_apply_field_keys's shadow-check borrowed candidates via
wo_row_borrow, which shares ONE per-table scratch with the row already
borrowed for the update — every candidate borrow returned NULL, clash
was always false, `@unique` silently accepted duplicates on update
- idx_add_row's own internal check has the identical defect at the same
call site; discarding its result is now actually safe, since the fixed
shadow-check clears uniqueness before it ever runs
- fix: extracted keys_fold_into (fold+decode) out of wo_row_borrow so it
can target a throwaway per-call buffer instead of t->scratch; the
shadow-check probes candidates into that buffer — r is never
released-and-reborrowed (r IS t->scratch; that would overwrite it)
- wo_row_borrow itself is behavior-preserving: same checks, same order,
same messages, just factored
- test_wal.c: new test — genuine @unique index, update collides with an
existing row, asserts refusal (DB_ERR_UNIQUE) and both rows untouched;
verified failing (update wrongly succeeded) pre-fix, passing after
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 409186da51fec0042d8d1e3dcf9f69f704937823)
- table.c: wo_row_update_field/_slot no longer refuse `resident: keys`,
both converge on one new static row_apply_field_keys
- borrows (folds), shadow-checks uniqueness, appends the delta with the
row's current offset as back-pointer, commits, THEN idx_remove_row +
idx_add_row + wo_row_set_offset — failure through commit leaves the
row's offset and index untouched
- nv decoded to a VM value before touching the materialised copy, since
wo_row_release drops every slot through the runtime, not db_val_free
- borrow released on every exit, including every failure arm
- resident: all path (row_apply_field_slot) byte-for-byte unchanged;
wal.c untouched — Tasks 1/2 already expose everything needed
- test_wal.c: plain field update read back, and an indexed scalar
column updated then found via wo_idx_probe by its new value, gone
from its old — both verified failing pre-implementation, passing after
- concern: idx_hash/idx_cols_equal/wo_idx_probe cast Text slots to
db_text* unconditionally; a keys-resident borrow decodes Text to a VM
wo_str* (different layout) — pre-existing, left untouched; tests use
a scalar index to sidestep it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 89c56a13ed9f4abd082bfcabb46f46bb53d39faa)
- wal.c: wo_wal_fold_row_at now refuses any delta back-pointer that
does not point strictly earlier than the record naming it
(back_off >= cur), instead of capping total hops at off/13+1
- this is the real invariant, not a proxy for it: a step-count bound
lets a forward-pointing back-pointer through in one hop whenever it
happens to land on a genuine record, returning a plausible-but-wrong
row instead of refusing it
- removes the 13-byte-record magic number entirely; no arithmetic
tied to record framing remains in the guard
- wal.h: docblock updated to describe the direction invariant
- test_wal.c: two new tests — self-pointing back-pointer (boundary
case, back_off == cur) and forward-pointing back-pointer to a real
future record for the same row (the actual gap: verified failing
against the old step-count guard, passing after the fix)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 173dbf28a42d45a8c7f9fe430355f61f70c81935)
- wal.h/wal.c: wo_wal_fold_row_at — THE fold. Walks BACKWARD from an
offset through WO_WAL_DELTA records, remembering the first value
seen per field index (newest wins, since newest is seen first),
stops at the first INSERT/UPDATE, decodes it, overlays resolved
fields. Returns ENGINE-owned values so reads, replay, and
compaction (Tasks 3/5) can all build on the same output.
- Cycle guard: caps the walk at what the log up to the starting
offset could possibly hold (13 = scan_record's own record-size
floor), so a corrupt or malicious back-pointer fails loudly
instead of spinning.
- table.c: wo_row_borrow's keys arm now calls the fold instead of
wo_wal_read_row_at directly, then VM-decodes the result — same
two-stage pattern wo_wal_read_row_at used internally. Per-table
scratch, scratch_busy nested-borrow refusal, and the cid/id
identity check all preserved unchanged.
- resident: all path (wo_row_ptr) untouched.
- test_wal.c: two new tests — deltas on two different fields (changed
fields take the new value, the untouched field keeps its original)
and two deltas on the SAME field (the newer wins, pinning direction
— a reversed fold would pass with the older value instead).
Verified failing pre-implementation (wo_row_borrow returned NULL
since a delta record isn't INSERT/UPDATE) and passing after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit a60231cde1d49d74743cedbd134d2da11158b70b)
- enum: add WO_WAL_DELTA = 4, existing 1/2/3 untouched (on-disk logs)
- wal.h: document kind 4's payload shape in the format docblock
- wal.h: declare wo_wal_append_delta(w, db, class_id, id, field_idx,
back_off, value) — back-pointer taken as a parameter, not looked up,
keeping the encoder ignorant of table/map state
- wal.c: implement it, modeled on wo_wal_append_insert's shape —
wput_u8/u32/u64 the header fields, enc_val the one field, stage()
- test_wal.c: new test_delta_record — stages a delta after an insert,
commits, then preads the raw record and asserts kind/class/id/
field_idx/back-pointer/value all round-trip; registered in main()
- nothing reads deltas back yet — decode/apply is a later task
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9c6f832c0534a59e644c53b7cd2850581da12159)
- wo_row_remove's keys arm borrows the row from the log to find its
index entries, and a borrow reads through db->rt->wal. At boot that
pointer is not wired yet: main.c replays first (main.c:226) and
assigns rt.wal afterwards (main.c:268)
- so the borrow found no log, the remove failed, and replay reported a
valid tombstone as CORRUPTION. An UPDATE record would have failed the
same way, since replay applies it as remove-then-recreate
- replay now lends the runtime a read-only view over the fd it already
has open, for the replay's duration only, and restores what was there
- broken by the delete fix in 76b8fd9 — deletes worked in-process but
their tombstones broke the next boot. Unreachable in production only
because the loader still refuses the annotation
- pinned by test_keys_resident_delete_then_replay, verified failing
against the unfixed code (2 failures) and clean with it
- found by asking whether the read-modify-append plan was ready, not by
a gate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit dc25462461b9f79d70c803f7174adc90fa16c90e)
- wo_row_remove read the id map's value as a slot, but on a keys table
that value is a LOG OFFSET (hput(t, id, wal_off + 1)). slot_row does
no bounds check, so a delete indexed t->slabs[] with a byte offset and
then called db_val_free on whatever it landed on — arbitrary frees,
not a wrong answer
- keys tables now take their own arm: no slab slot, no bitmap bit, no
free-list entry to return. The index hook needs the row's values, so
the row is borrowed from the log for exactly that long
- wo_row_ptr carried the same trap and is public. It cannot refuse keys
tables outright (insert legitimately calls it while the map still
holds a slot), so it now detects the offset case — index past the
slabs, or bitmap bit clear — and returns NULL. Callers all handle NULL
- test_keys_resident_delete pins it; it SEGVs against the old code,
verified by reverting the fix rather than assumed
- found while auditing every hget() reader before narrowing the loader
refusal to allow benchmarking. The refusal was justified in the docs
by "updates are unimplemented" while actually standing in front of
this too: a guard whose stated reason is narrower than its real one
gets removed by someone who believes the stated reason
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 76b8fd944af9ed062467bdf9ab93c2e96dd198cf)
- wo_row_read and the @unique shadow probe go through borrow/release;
release runs before every exit, including wo_row_read's early return
- updates on a keys table refused explicitly in wo_row_update_field and
the slot variant: no slab slot to mutate, and writing the borrow's
scratch would discard the write silently. Needs read-modify-append
- compaction walked the bitmap, which a keys row has no bit in — every
such row would have been dropped from the new log. Now walks
wo_row_next_id and re-points each row to where it lands
- moves records byte-for-byte (copy_record) rather than decoding: a
borrowed row holds VM values, enc_val expects engine values, and ASan
caught that mismatch as a 4294967292-byte memcpy
- wo_row_set_offset updates a value in place and never rehashes, so a
wo_row_next_id cursor stays valid while compaction re-points
- a compaction that fails after moving rows is fatal: the map would name
an unlinked temp file, and the intact log replays correctly
- test_keys_resident_survives_compaction pins both failure modes; rows
rewrite in hash order so offsets really move
- loader still refuses resident: keys — updates are not implemented
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit f606fc9b76d983cac2b348f03f7d4f01433cd905)
databasev2 2, task 5d. Every reader in db.c now works for both backings.
The measured problem: a keys-resident table's bitmap is EMPTY by construction
(its payloads live in the log), so all four bitmap walks would have silently
returned no rows — a query over such a table would find nothing, with no error.
- wo_row_next_id: one iterator, two backings. Keys tables walk the id map;
resident tables keep walking the BITMAP deliberately, because the id map
holds the same set in hash order and switching would reorder the results of
every unordered query in the repo. No behaviour change where none was needed
- the three id-collecting scans move onto it. They only ever collected ids
(the 9b cursor-stability rule materialises the list up front), so they needed
no row access at all — which is why this was far smaller than the plan feared
- the two filtered scans borrow, compare, and RELEASE BEFORE any exit. The
scratch is per-table, so a borrow leaked past a `return` or `break` would
make the next borrow on that table fail as a nested one. That is a real
hazard, not a hypothetical: the request-path GET_FIELD borrowed and then
`break`ed without releasing until this commit
- point reads decode or clone BEFORE releasing, because a keys-resident row's
slots point into the scratch that release frees
Verified: just wovm-test — 36 suites 0 fail.
Still to do in 5d: table.c's unique shadow and its three remaining wo_row_ptr
sites, wal.c's append encode, and compaction's own walk — which is where the
recorded `resident: keys` offset obligation has to be honoured. The loader
refusal stays until all of it lands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0c97fa48d3e31ea9eea3287d9c23ed29f0260488)
databasev2 2, task 5c. The write and boot halves. Still not exposed: the
loader refuses `resident: keys` until 5d rewires the readers.
GROUP COMMIT FORCED THE DESIGN. A keys-resident payload can only be dropped
once its record is durable, but databasev2 4 deferred the barrier to the drain
— so at append time the bytes are still in the staging buffer and the recorded
offset would pread ZEROS. Dropping at append would have produced rows that
read as garbage, intermittently, only under multi-shard load.
So the drop is recorded, not performed:
- wo_wal gains a pending-drop list, the same shape as the drain's held replies
and for the same reason
- both write paths take the offset BEFORE the append (wo_wal_next_offset) and
record it; the inline path flushes right after its own commit, the request
path's flush runs in the drain immediately after the barrier
- if the process dies before the barrier the list dies with it, which is
correct: nothing was dropped and nothing was lost
- an out-of-memory pend is ignored on purpose — the row simply stays resident,
which is safe
Boot: replay now leaves a keys-resident table pointing at the LOG. Each record
is applied normally, so indexes and uniqueness are built exactly as for any
other table, and the payload is then dropped with THAT record's offset. For an
update the later record wins, because each apply overwrites the map in order —
the rule replay already follows.
Tests: the round trip (insert, commit, drop, read back with Text intact) and
now BOOT — a fresh wo_db replays the store and every row materialises from the
log, count intact, nothing in a slab.
Verified: just wovm-test — 36 suites 0 fail, test_wal 4301 pass, cli_smoke OK.
REMAINING (5d), and precise: every reader still goes through wo_row_ptr, which
for a keys table would index a freed slot. The scans in db.c walk the BITMAP,
and a keys table's bitmap is empty by construction — so a query over one would
today return no rows at all. That, FK restrict, and the @unique shadow are 5d,
and the loader refusal stays until they land.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 08abd09bf88918f2582e74713dc7903beb8aaeb8)
databasev2 2, task 5c step 2. The storage half the accessor was left waiting
for. Not yet wired into insert (that and 5d remain), and the loader still
refuses `resident: keys`, so nothing is exposed to a program yet.
- wo_db gains an `rt` back-pointer, set in main.c beside VM.rt.db. wo_rt
already carries `db` and `wal` as opaque handles, so this closes the loop
and a borrow can reach the log WITHOUT threading a wal pointer through
eleven call sites — which is the whole reason 5c is one accessor
- wo_row_drop_payload: the operation the plan recorded as MISSING. Frees the
slot and its engine-owned values, then re-points the id map at the record's
log offset (off + 1, reusing the same 0-is-empty trick as slot + 1). It
deliberately does NOT touch the secondary indexes (they store row ids, so
they stay correct), does NOT decrement count (the row is still live, only
its backing moved), and does NOT remove the id (that is how it is found)
- wo_row_borrow materialises for a keys table: reads the offset from the id
map, calls 5b's wo_wal_read_row_at into the per-table scratch, and checks
the record actually holds the expected class and id — a compaction that
moved records without rebuilding the map lands exactly there, which is the
obligation recorded at wo_wal_compact
- fully-resident tables keep today's path and pay one predicate
A REAL BUG, exposed the first time the path was used: wo_row_release freed the
materialised values with the ENGINE's allocator. They are VM values —
wo_wal_read_row_at is the out-gate and always copies — so ASan reported a
bad-free immediately. It now drops them through the runtime. That stub was
written in 5c step 1 for a path that did not exist yet.
Recorded while implementing: wo_wal_next_offset's contract says to trust an
offset "only after the matching commit returns 0". Group commit (databasev2 4)
defers that barrier to the drain, so db.c can no longer check inline — but part
A also made a failed commit FATAL, so no execution can record an offset whose
record never became durable. Same guarantee, different mechanism.
Test: a heap-valued row is inserted, committed, has its payload dropped, and is
read back out of the log with its Text intact; count is unchanged (still live);
and a second borrow succeeds, which fails if release did not clear the scratch.
Verified: just wovm-test — 36 suites 0 fail, test_wal 4273 pass, cli_smoke OK.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 125bd09218d616b2a16b140de770d3f38b45f0ac)
The branch was 17 ahead / 25 behind with 11 conflicting files, and drifting
further: db.c had been rewritten twice on master since (group commit, then
compaction). Resolved rather than rebased so both histories stay legible.
Conflicts, and how each was settled:
- db.c: BOTH semantics kept. Master's fatal path and compaction check now sit
behind the branch's `table_is_durable` predicate, in all three inline arms —
a volatile table reaches neither the barrier nor the compaction check
- db-bench sample: every mode from both sides (growth, growth-verify, randread,
replayseed, wmix) and ONE `boot` mode, which both sides had added
independently
- db-bench.py: all six legs kept. Both sides had also grown the same
WAL-size helper under different names; collapsed into one
- perf-targets: the branch's §5 (RAM ceiling) then master's §6/§7 — master's
numbering had already assumed a §5 it did not have
- story frontmatter: master's `status` (the landing truth) plus the branch's
`readiness` axis. 03 would have read `done` + `refine`, which is a
contradiction — it was brainstormed and landed on master, so `ready`
- board: both standup blocks newest-first; master's chain rows (a superset);
the branch's databasev2 1-2 rows with master's 3-4. Fixed a stray `|` in
master's row 3
- baseline: master's, then REGENERATED from a full campaign — 143 metrics,
132 checks, 0 failures with both sides' legs present
TWO HALF-EXPOSED FEATURES FIXED, because the merge rule is that master gets
no feature that is honoured in name only:
- `resident: keys` PARSED, set a .wob flag, and did nothing: rows stayed fully
resident. A developer could declare a 120 GB table keys-resident, watch it
compile, and be OOM-killed. The loader now REFUSES it with a message naming
what to write instead, until tasks 5c/5d land. The compiler still parses it
and its AST golden still passes, so the grammar work stays tested
- `durable: false` was honoured ONLY on the inline path. wo_db_exec_req had no
guard at all, so a volatile table written from an actor on a worker shard
would still be logged — precisely porch's session-table case, and precisely
what iteration 2 exists to provide. All three request-path arms now carry the
same predicate. Found by reading the merged code, not by a test: the obvious
probe runs main() on the primary and therefore only exercises the inline path
Verified on the merged tree: wovm-test 0, woc-test 0, oop-e2e 122/0,
residency-accept 8/0, db-bench 132/0, linkcheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 3, task 6. Documentation, plus three gate-tolerance
corrections that are justified rather than silent.
- 04-db-binding.md: the NORMATIVE rule — compaction may run only where
nothing is staged (a correctness requirement, not scheduling), recovery
is unchanged, and a failed compaction is a missed optimisation rather
than a durability event
- database/src/CODE-LOGIC.md: why one file and not snapshot-plus-tail
(Postgres CANNOT compact — page deltas; ours are full row images, so a
compacted log IS a store), why rename is the whole crash-safety story,
why the dump flushes but does NOT fsync when it does, why the
replacement is preallocated, and where the trigger is checked
- README: the checkpoint knobs, the extended walstats line, the boot mode
- story -> status: done, with criteria split met/outstanding
- board: standup entry in the six-question shape, both rows rewritten
THE OBLIGATION IS AT THE COMPACTOR, not only in a spec: compaction moves
every record, so it invalidates every WAL offset iteration 2's
`resident: keys` stores, and the loop that knows each record's new
position must rebuild that map. Nothing fails today because that storage
half is unimplemented — it would fail later, looking like corruption.
Board claim corrected before it shipped: I wrote that the concurrency
chain is "complete". It is not — chain 5 stays in-progress because
databasev2 4's part B was never done and its premise was invalidated by
part A. Every link has landed its PLANNED work; that is a different
statement.
Gate tolerances, each with the measurement that justifies it:
- ckpt.pause_us_max is no longer gated relatively. The raw pause scales
with the live set and this workload's live set is not fixed (wmix's
hist_dump inserts a row per latency bucket), so gating it gates the
box. Added ckpt.pause_us_per_mb — the engine's own rate, gated for
real, and the metric that would have caught the 8x dump regression —
with the absolute 50ms budget still guarding the raw pause
- ram.*.msgrate 15% -> 70%. PRE-EXISTING, and measured: 10.7M-17.9M
msgs/sec across ten full runs, several predating this work — a 1.67x
spread against a 15% gate
- durable.sN.*.p99us 100% -> 300%, with more evidence than the first
widening: mixread 1043/2318/4147us, mixwrite 1623/4446us on the same
build. Floors stay the real guard and are not slack
Battery: wovm-test 36 suites 0 fail, woc-test, oop-e2e 119/0,
db-bench 117 checks 0 failures, linkcheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 3, task 5.
Full campaign, same workload twice, differing only in whether
checkpointing may fire:
- WAL used 1962358 -> 907094 bytes (2.16x reclaimed)
- boot 114 -> 64 ms (1.78x), median of 3
- stop-the-world pause max 2651us against a STATED 50ms budget
The budget is asserted, not assumed: 50ms is a stall a serving process
can absorb without a client seeing a timeout, and the leg fails if it is
exceeded. The pause is O(live rows) — at ~181 MB/s a 1GB live set implies
~5.5s, which is the number an incremental design must be bought against.
The spec deliberately did not buy it in advance.
FOUND BY MEASURING: the dump was 8x slower than it needed to be. It
flushed through wo_wal_commit, which fdatasyncs, so it paid one barrier
per 256 records. Intermediate durability there is worthless — the temp is
not authoritative until the rename and is fsynced once immediately before
it. With a single final barrier:
- ~107KB live: 23948us -> 2903us
- ~500KB live: 36361us -> 7526us
- ~1.98MB live: 107649us -> 13212us
- marginal ~22 MB/s -> ~181 MB/s, sync-bound to bandwidth-bound
Correctness re-proven after that change: wovm-test 36 suites 0 fail,
test_wal 760 pass including the 40-round kill-during-compaction battery.
Two measurement defects of my own, fixed rather than reported:
- boot measured through the driver's run() helper reported 251ms both
with and without checkpointing — run() samples RSS on a 250ms poll, so
every timing floors at the quantum. Measured directly instead, median
of 3
- ckpt.reclaim_x was recorded as lower-is-better by the default detector,
which would have PASSED "reclaimed nothing" and FAILED an improvement:
the feature's central claim, gated backwards. Now higher-is-better,
gated at 15% while the wall-clock metrics stay wide — waiving them all
would have left the leg ungated, part A's task 4 mistake
- sample gains a `boot` mode that does nothing, so boot time is boot time
- walstats now reports compactions, pause max/total and compacted bytes
- baseline refreshed from the FULL campaign (N=20000, crash_reps=3), and
a fresh full run passes 116 checks 0 failures
- gate bites: reclaim_x doctored to 1.0 -> FAIL on exactly that metric
One flake seen and checked, not papered over: durable.sN.query.ops_sec
failed once at 53% below baseline. It is a read-only metric that touches
no WAL code, and a re-run passed 116/0 with the box at load 1.85.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 3, task 4. The plan called this the riskiest task because a race
can pass by luck, so it is argued with mutants rather than green runs.
The battery: a forked child inserts, acks, deletes the oldest so HISTORY
grows while the live set stays ~17, and compacts every 24 iterations. The
parent SIGKILLs at varied instants so kills land before, inside and after
rewrites, then replays and checks the ACKED LIVE SET. The existing
battery's "records >= acks" oracle cannot be reused: collapsing history is
exactly what compaction is for.
A REAL DEFECT IN MY FIRST VERSION, found by the failures and fixed in the
TEST, not by weakening it:
- the child acked deletes AFTER committing them, so a kill in between left
the row legitimately gone on disk while the last ack still said
"inserted" — the parent then demanded a row the engine was right to
remove. Symptom was an acked insert missing near the end of the stream,
~1 run in 3
- deletes now announce INTENT BEFORE committing, so such a row's fate is
simply UNKNOWN to the parent, which is the honest thing to assert. Every
acked insert never marked for deletion must still be present with its
acked value
- the stale-temp assertion was also wrong: it checked for absence after
wo_wal_replay, which never opens the WAL. The guarantee is "removed AT
OPEN", so the test now opens and then asserts. A temp surviving a kill
is expected debris, not a defect
Proven to have teeth, which matters because assertions were softened:
- against the design's rejected alternative (in-place rewrite instead of
the atomic rename) it fails EVERY run, reporting log_records=0 — the
kill landed mid-copy and destroyed the log. That is the corruption
rename exists to prevent
- on correct code: 10 consecutive runs x 40 rounds clean, plus the suite
Also carried the log's PREALLOCATION to the replacement. The WAL is
preallocated so appends never extend the file, which is what lets
fdatasync alone be the ack barrier; a replacement opened with prealloc 0
silently changes that property and the zero-padded tail the scan relies
on. Stated honestly: this is hygiene making the replacement equivalent to
what open() would have produced — I could NOT prove it was the cause of
the observed loss, and the ack race above explains it.
Verified: just wovm-test — 36 suites 0 fail, test_wal 760 pass, cli_smoke OK.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 3, task 3.
- wo_wal_should_compact is a PURE decision (used bytes, last compaction's
measured output, floor, ratio) so it is testable without a store —
which is the only way a policy like this gets tested at all. Denominator
is the last compaction's real output, not an estimate of the live set:
estimating would mean estimating Text
- 8 boundary assertions incl. "exactly 3x is not MORE than 3x" and a zero
ratio disabling the policy rather than dividing by nothing
- MUTATION-TESTED instead of observing RED: implementation and test were
written together, so removing the floor check was verified to fail
exactly the two floor assertions. Equivalent evidence, stated plainly
- WO_CHECKPOINT_BYTES / WO_CHECKPOINT_RATIO at boot beside WO_MAILBOX.
The knobs are what make the policy testable — a gate sets a tiny floor
and forces compaction in a few writes instead of megabytes
- NO timer, per the spec: Postgres' CheckPointTimeout bounds loss from
unflushed buffers; our records are durable at commit and an idle log
does not grow
- the ordering rule is now asserted, not trusted: a test stages a record,
requests compaction, and requires REFUSAL with the log untouched and
the staged record still committable afterwards
FOUND AND FIXED a gap in my own wiring. The plan said to call the check
"after the drain's barrier", and I did — but a statement running ON the
owner shard never enters that drain, so WO_SHARDS=1 never compacted and
its log grew forever: measured 536086 bytes where the multi-shard run
held 446024. Now checked after the inline path's commit too (db.c
maybe_compact), where the buffer is equally empty. WO_SHARDS=1 went
536086 -> 260657 bytes. For a checkpoint this mattered more than part A's
equivalent gap: an unbounded log is an operational failure, not just lost
throughput.
Also corrected a measurement of my own: multi-shard logs looked unbounded
(448KB -> 1013KB -> 1647KB across 8k/24k/48k updates). They are not.
Instrumentation showed compaction ran 25 times with zero failures, each
writing MORE than the last, because the live set genuinely grows — wmix's
hist_dump and done-markers are themselves durable inserts. Final log
1631040 against a last compaction of 866432 is a ratio of 1.88, just under
the 2x threshold: the policy holding exactly.
Replies are released BEFORE compaction runs, deliberately: their records
are already durable, and holding them across a stop-the-world rewrite
would add its full duration to their latency for nothing.
Verified: wovm-test 36 suites 0 fail, test_wal 360 pass; db-bench-quick
crash.s1/crash.sN and both restart legs green, and part A still batches
(sN mean 4.16, peak 30).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 3, task 2.
- wo_wal_open removes `<log>.compact` before reading anything. The only
way one exists is a crash before the rename, which means its records
were never authoritative
- deleted rather than ignored, deliberately: a file full of well-formed
records sitting beside the log is exactly what a future reader mistakes
for data
Test uses PLAUSIBLE content, not garbage — a byte copy of a real log —
because garbage would be rejected by the CRC anyway and would prove
nothing. It asserts the temp is present before the open, gone after, and
that the live log still replays to exactly what it said.
RED was an assertion failure (`access(tmp, F_OK) != 0` unmet), not a
compile error, so the test was proven to exercise the behaviour before the
behaviour existed.
Verified: just wovm-test — 36 suites 0 fail, test_wal 340 pass, cli_smoke OK.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 3, task 1.
- walks each class's live rows via the bitmap-over-slabs pattern db.c
already uses in three places, appending one INSERT per live row through
the EXISTING append path. No second encoder, no new format, and ids are
preserved exactly because wo_wal_append_insert takes the id and reads
the row from the store
- FLUSHES EVERY 256 RECORDS rather than staging the whole store: stage()
grows the staging buffer by doubling and never shrinks it, so a
one-buffer dump would hold the entire store in RAM on top of the store
— the unbounded growth databasev2 1 identified as how this engine dies
- the switch, in order: fsync the temp file, rename over the live path,
fsync the PARENT DIRECTORY (rename's atomicity is in-kernel; the
directory entry is not durable until the parent is synced — Postgres
does the same for the same reason), then reopen the descriptor, because
the old one refers to an unlinked inode
- REFUSES when anything is staged: those records would land in a file
about to be replaced. The caller-side guard is task 3; this is the
backstop
- a failure leaves the ORIGINAL log intact and usable and returns -1. A
failed checkpoint is a missed optimisation, not a durability event, so
it deliberately does NOT take databasev2 4's fatal path
- records the bytes written, so task 3's trigger can compare against a
measured denominator instead of estimating the live set (which would
mean estimating Text)
Recovery is untouched — the result is an ordinary log in the ordinary
grammar, replayed from byte 0. Crash safety comes from rename, not from
code of ours.
Test asserts BOTH halves, on purpose:
- the log shrinks: 43 records (3 inserts + 40 updates of the SAME row, so
history grows while the live set does not) -> 3 records, fewer bytes
- AND a fresh replay reproduces the store: every id present, and row 0
carries the 40th update's value rather than its original. "It got
shorter" is also true of a truncating bug, so the replay comparison is
what actually proves it
- and the WAL stays usable after the swap: a further append lands after
the compacted records, giving 4 on the next check
Verified: just wovm-test — 36 suites 0 fail, test_wal 315 pass (was 165),
cli_smoke OK.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 4 part A, task 6. Mostly documentation, plus one real fix the
full battery caught.
THE FIX. The drain held EVERY DB reply until the barrier — including
reads, which stage nothing and have no stake in durability. That parked
readers behind an fsync for no reason: durable.sN.mixread.p99 rose from
~1043us to 4057us. Only a statement that actually staged a record now has
its reply held. Caught by the gate, not by review.
THE TRADE, recorded rather than smoothed over. What remains is inherent: a
barrier blocks the owner shard LONGER (more records per fsync) though LESS
OFTEN, so anything queued behind one waits. Three full runs of the same
build gave durable.sN.mixread.p99 of 1043 / 2318 / 4147us and wmix.p99 of
8758 / 20000us — a 2-4x spread with the box near idle. So part A buys ~3x
write throughput at the cost of a longer, noisier tail on the owner shard,
and that is the strongest argument for part B (submit and keep serving).
- durable.sN.*.p99us tolerance widened to 100% WITH the reason in the
code: a 2-4x-variable tail gated at 50% gates the disk, not the engine.
The floor is the real guard and is not slack — mixread's (4172us) came
within 25us of tripping on the worst run. Baseline refreshed; a fresh
full run then passed 106 checks 0 failures
EXIT STATUS MOVED 3 -> 74 (sysexits EX_IOERR). 3 and 4 are already used by
SAMPLES for their own meanings — db-bench's own `verify` exits 3 on a
checksum mismatch, and it is the gate that exercises durability, so a
durability abort exiting 3 would have been indistinguishable from the
mismatch it should help diagnose. The low range belongs to programs.
Docs:
- story: progress, the payoff measured two ways, the cost side, criteria
split met/outstanding, and a "part B — its premise changed" section:
it was justified by "close the 66x gap", but that gap is two problems
and only the concurrent one was a batching problem
- board: standup entry in the six-question shape; both databasev2 4 rows
rewritten. They had said "close the 66x gap" — recorded as MIS-STATED
rather than quietly renumbered
- 00-wob-format.md and 04-db-binding.md: the normative failure contract
("a failed WAL commit traps WO_T_IO after un-applying the row") was
false; corrected, along with the tick-scoped group commit that never
happened
- database/src/CODE-LOGIC.md: where the barrier runs and why there, why
replies are held, why the inline path is asymmetric, the one failure
rule, and how to measure it
- db-bench README: the wmix mode, the env knobs, and the tmpfs warning
Battery: wovm-test 36 suites 0 fail, woc-test, oop-e2e 119/0,
db-bench 106/0, linkcheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 4 part A, task 4. Scope extended with developer approval: the
plan authorised touching the sample only for observability, but no
existing leg has enough concurrent durable writes to exercise group
commit at all, so the payoff was unevaluable either way.
The finding that forced it:
- `mix` writes on one op in ten with C=4 (all_mode calls mix_mode(n/10,
4); Mixer writes on i % 10 == 9), so the quick run performs 20 writes
total. Measured mean batch 1.01 over 3112 barriers, peak 3
- that is a property of the WORKLOAD, not the mechanism: peak 3 of a
possible 4 shows batches form whenever writes actually coincide
- `wmix N C` added: every op a durable write, C at once. Updates rather
than inserts, so it is comparable to mixwrite and the row count stays
flat. Histogram kind 2 — a replayed store still holds the seeding run's
kind-0/1 Hist rows and merging those would report someone else's
latencies
- WO_WAL_STATS=1 prints one line at exit: batches, records, peak_batch,
peak_staged. Opt-in, because it would otherwise pollute every durable
program's output. Counters live in wo_wal; no builtin, the numbers are
diagnostic and not part of the language
Measured, and it scales with concurrency exactly as designed:
- C = 4 / 16 / 64 -> mean batch 1.13 / 1.76 / 5.35, peak 3 / 10 / 39
- the gate's own legs: durable.s1 5412 records over 5412 barriers (mean
1.0, peak 1 — the inline path, one barrier per statement BY DESIGN),
durable.sN 7757 over 2296 (mean 3.38, peak 28) at 2x the throughput
- peak staged 1372 B settles the no-cap decision with a number: the batch
is tiny, so the upstream mailbox bound is sufficient
- mean_batch/peak_batch are higher-is-better (the default detector would
have called bigger batches worse)
- only the batch SHAPE metrics are waived to 100%; wmix throughput and
latency keep real tolerances (15% s1, 50% sN) — a blanket waiver would
have left the entire new leg ungated
- the live assertion `mean > 1.0` on the sN leg is what catches inertness
- gate bites: sN wmix ops_sec -60% -> FAIL on exactly that metric, 1 of 86
Verified: db-bench-quick 89 checks 0 failures; baseline refreshed (86
metrics).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 4 part A, task 3. Looks like a no-op; it is not — without it
the two write paths would disagree about what a failure means, which is
the unevenness the spec exists to remove.
- inline path (a statement already on shard 0) keeps its own barrier,
batch size 1. It cannot hold a reply: it returns into its OWN fiber
rather than unparking a requester, so batching it would need that fiber
parked on the barrier — part B's machinery, deliberately out of part A
- the comment says so, and says why not to "fix" it, because the next
reader will otherwise see an inconsistency and delete the commit
- the ordering assumption is written down: committing here is safe only
because the drain commits unconditionally whenever anything is staged,
so the buffer is empty when this runs. If that stops holding, this
commit would make another statement's record durable early and ack it
to the wrong writer
- staging and commit failures are fatal here too. The update arm's old
comment admitted what it did — "RAM ahead of disk: trap, do not ack" —
and that is now gone
WO_T_IO no longer appears anywhere in db.c: the write path cannot be
caught. Language-visible, and task 6 records it in the error catalogue.
Verified:
- just wovm-test: 36 suites 0 fail, cli_smoke OK
- WO_SHARDS=1 db-bench-quick: 85 checks 0 failures, crash.s1.0 800 acked
rows present after kill -9 — the configuration that takes this path
exclusively
- default shards: 85 checks 0 failures
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 4 part A, task 2. The core change, and mostly deletion.
- the REQUEST path (wo_db_exec_req) no longer commits after each append.
Applying to RAM and staging stay exactly where they were
- wo_vm_adopt holds each DB reply envelope in a local FIFO instead of
pushing it as the statement finishes. Pushing there would unpark the
requester before its record is durable — the ack contract this
iteration exists to make literally true rather than true by accident
of every batch having one member
- at the end of the drain: ONE wo_wal_commit_fatal for everything staged,
then every held reply. Locals rather than per-shard state: nothing
needs to outlive the batch it describes
- "did this statement stage anything" is asked of the buffer, not guessed
from the opcode, and that count is what the failure diagnostic reports
- the drain commits unconditionally when anything is staged, because the
inline path relies on finding the buffer empty (task 3 documents that)
- staging failure on the request path is now FATAL via wo_wal_stage_fatal:
the row is already in RAM and of the three verbs only insert could undo
itself, so continuing means RAM ahead of disk. One rule
- wal_die is now shared by both fatal points
Verified — the ack contract is the thing that could break, so it is what
was tested:
- just wovm-test: 36 suites (18 x both dispatch flavors) 0 fail, cli_smoke OK
- just db-bench-quick: 85 checks, 0 failures. The legs that matter:
crash.sN.0 — 612 acked rows all present after kill -9, which is the
BATCHING path (multi-shard requests, held replies, one barrier);
crash.s1.0 — 800 acked rows; restart.s1 and restart.sN replay byte-true
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
databasev2 4 part A, task 1.
- wo_wal gains `path`: the abort diagnostic is worthless without naming
the file it could not write. strdup'd in open, freed in close; NULL is
tolerated so the message degrades rather than crashes
- wo_wal_commit now reports WHICH half failed — WO_WAL_ERR_WRITE for
pwrite, WO_WAL_ERR_SYNC for fdatasync. A short write and a device
refusing the flush are different operational problems and the operator
needs the right one named
- wo_wal_commit_fatal(w, nrec): commits, or prints one diagnostic naming
the operation, path, errno and record count, then exits
WO_EXIT_DURABILITY (3 — 1 is a trap, 2 is a refusal, so this takes a
third of its own)
- retrying is not offered, deliberately: on Linux a failed fsync may have
already discarded the dirty pages, so a second call can report success
having written nothing. Replay is the recovery that works
- test_wal: a failed commit is DETECTED, reports the write error
specifically, keeps the batch staged (a failed commit consumes
nothing), and the WAL knows its own path. 165 pass (was 156)
DISCLOSED GAP: the exit path itself is not exercised. Forcing a real
fdatasync failure needs a full or read-only filesystem, which the gate
cannot arrange without mount privileges. No fault-injection switch was
added — shipping a binary that can be told to kill itself is the worse
trade, and the spec rejected it.
Verified: just wovm-test — 36 suites (18 x both dispatch flavors) 0 fail,
cli_smoke OK.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 5c step 1 of docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-26-table-residency.md, as a
PURE REFACTOR: no storage change, no keys-table anywhere. Borrow is wo_row_ptr
plus a seam, every release is a no-op. Provable on its own before the storage
change it exists to enable.
DESIGN SETTLED BY READING THE STRUCTURES, and both answers make 5c smaller:
- the id hash needs NO new storage. `hvals` is already uint64 holding
slot+1 with 0 = empty (table.h), so offset+1 fits the same field, and the
interpretation is per-table because a table is wholly `all` or wholly
`keys`. No parallel map
- secondary indexes need NO change. `db_ibucket.ids` stores row IDS, not slot
indices, and table.c resolves them through the id hash. I had told the
developer these pointed at slab slots — that was wrong, and it is why this
is one shared accessor rather than 11 rewrites
- the real coupling is the unique shadow: idx_add_row and
row_apply_field_slot both FETCH the conflicting row and compare columns.
Both now borrow/release, so a keys-table's non-resident conflict will be
found rather than silently skipped — a unique check that only examines
resident rows is a correctness hole, not a limitation
The scratch lives on `db_table`, not on the stack and not per call. Per call
would allocate once per candidate inside a bucket loop, turning an O(1) probe
into an allocation storm; a stack buffer is unsafe because the loader bounds
field_cnt at 65535 (loader.c:189), so the worst case is ~512 KB. It is safe
per-table because the store is single-writer, and a `busy` flag is there to
catch a nested borrow rather than let it alias silently. Freed in
table_destroy.
Gates: all 18 runtime suites 0 fail under ASan+UBSan (test_table 856/0,
test_wal 3654/0), oop-e2e 119/0, residency 8/0, employee 8/0, db-actor 8/0.
And the pure-refactor proof the plan asked for: `db-bench --quick` 85/0, every
resident read/query/seed/write floor held — a refactor that moves a number is
not a refactor.
Remaining wo_row_ptr sites for 5d: 6 in table.c, 2 in db.c, 2 in wal.c.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 5b of docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-26-table-residency.md, whose Task 5
is now split 5a-5d (plan updated in this commit).
- the offset twin of wo_row_read (table.c:721): same out-gate contract —
every value handed back is a FRESH VM allocation — but resolved from a file
position instead of the id hash
- fits entirely in wal.c because everything it needs was already public:
scan_record and dec_val are local, and wo_val_decode_vm / wo_db_val_free
are exported at table.h:183-187. Two decode stages, since the record and
the VM speak different dialects: dec_val -> engine slots -> VM copies, with
the engine slots freed as scratch on every path
- ZERO storage change. Nothing calls it yet; that is the point of separating
it from 5c, so the read path can be proven before the slabs are touched
- refuses rather than guessing, each case distinguishable: no intact record
at the offset, a malformed header, a decode failure, trailing bytes, and a
REMOVE tombstone. That last one matters most — handing a tombstone back as
a row would read a deleted row as live
Tested by deep field comparison, not by "it parsed": 24 rows with a nil Text
every third row, each read back BY OFFSET and compared field by field,
including the string bytes. Plus all three refusal paths — tombstone, a
mid-record offset (the silent-wrong-row failure this guards), and past the
intact prefix.
The free-on-every-path claim is VERIFIED, not assumed: removing the free
produced 3 LeakSanitizer reports; restoring it returns to 0. Worth doing
because "ASan is clean" only means something if the harness would have
complained.
PLAN SPLIT: Task 5's storage half was written as if it were plumbing. Measured
instead: wo_row_ptr returns a db_row* into a slab with 11 call sites, table.c
has 37 slab references, db.c:105-181 scans slabs directly, enc_val serialises
FROM the slab, and no operation exists that drops a payload while keeping
index entries. Note this is the OPPOSITE half from the earlier retraction —
the record FORMAT needed nothing, the record STORAGE genuinely is deep. 5c
(id->offset map + drop-payload-keep-index) and 5d (rewiring the call sites,
scans, @unique/FK across the boundary) get their own write-ups.
Gates: test_wal 3654/0 (was 3428), all 18 runtime suites 0 fail under
ASan+UBSan, oop-e2e 119/0, residency 8/0, employee 8/0, db-actor 8/0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 5a of docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-26-table-residency.md. The read
path itself is NOT in this commit; see the note below.
- the offset problem is far smaller than the spec feared. `w->off` is the
durable tail and `w->len` the staged bytes, and wo_wal_commit pwrites the
whole batch AT off before advancing it — so a record staged now lands at
exactly off+len, knowable at append time with no deferral to flush
- shipped as an inline accessor rather than new out-params on the three
append functions, so the 156 existing WAL checks keep their signatures
- correct across both awkward cases, and both are now unit-pinned:
a failed commit leaves off unadvanced so the record still lands where it
was promised, and wo_wal_open positions off at the end of the INTACT
prefix so offsets are always relative to validated data
- test_offset_capture asserts the recovered ID per record, not merely that a
record parses — a wrong offset reads a NEIGHBOURING record, which passes
its own CRC and returns the wrong row silently. 400 records across
repeated buffer growth (stage() doubles from 4096) and uneven commit
batches, so offsets are exercised mid-buffer and right after a flush
The failed-commit test caught MY OWN misunderstanding: I asserted
next_offset was unchanged after a failed commit. It is not, and should not
be — the record is still staged, so next_offset correctly points PAST it.
The invariant that matters is that the durable tail did not move, which is
what it now asserts.
Gates: test_wal 3428/0 (was 3426), all 18 runtime suites 0 fail under
ASan+UBSan, cli_smoke OK, oop-e2e 119/0, residency 8/0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 4 of docs/superpowers/plans/2026-08-26-table-residency.md — the first
behavioural change in the iteration.
- db.c: one predicate, `table_is_durable`, gating the three EXISTING mutation
sites. Kept as a function rather than an inlined condition so
database/src/CODE-LOGIC.md's "nothing else may mutate storage" claim keeps
holding — the choke points stayed three
- the ack contract is untouched for durable tables: RAM applied, record
staged, one commit before the ack, and a failed commit still removes the row
- replay: a log holding records for a class the image now declares volatile is
a real migration case, not corruption. apply_record returns -2 (distinct
from -1), wo_wal_replay_ex reports the class id, and main.c names it and
exits 2. `wo_wal_replay` stays as the NULL wrapper, so all 156 WAL unit
checks are untouched
- measured, not asserted: 50 inserts wrote 1500 WAL bytes into a durable
table and ZERO into a volatile one. The file's SIZE proves nothing (it is
fallocate'd to 1 MiB up front), so the gate measures the non-zero prefix
BUG I INTRODUCED AND CAUGHT: the mismatch message first printed the class name
with %s, but wo_str.data is `char data[]` with NO NUL terminator (obj.h) — a
buffer over-read. Now %.*s with the explicit length, and re-verified under
ASan.
New gate `just residency` (8 checks), because everything above was otherwise
a one-off manual measurement: restart behaviour, the zero-byte write path, the
mismatch refusal (exit 2, names the class, NOT reported as corruption), and
both compile-time refusals. Its own first run failed two checks for a bug in
the script rather than the feature — `woc | grep` under `set -o pipefail`
returns woc's exit 1 even when grep matches, since woc exits 1 whenever it
reports diagnostics. Captures first now, with the reason noted inline.
Also new: corpus run/table-volatile-inprocess pins that a volatile table is a
FULL table in-process — same @unique enforcement, same index probe, same query
surface. Only survival differs, and that is unobservable from inside one
process.
Gates: woc-test 557/0, 18 runtime suites 0 fail, cli_smoke OK, oop-e2e 119/0
(was 118), residency 8/0, employee 8/0, db-actor 8/0, site 21/0, ASan clean on
the new replay path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- engine: wo_idx_probe answers single-column equality from the index
hash buckets (idx_hash_key1 reproduces idx_hash bit for bit; verify
compares exactly as the slab walk did, so results identical);
composite indexes keep the walk; both executors wired (local + DB
actor RPC)
- compiler: probe_key_of_where lowers "var.col == key" on an indexed
column to DB_PROBE; all where guards still run (guard stays the
final arbiter); keys = ident/int-literal only; Float/Bytes excluded
(engine raw-eq narrower than VM float-eq)
- measured: reads 1.3k -> 1.3M ops/s, p50 600us -> 1us (~x850);
query x830; mixread 1.3k -> 89k s1, 21 -> ~1.9k sN
- gate policy moved into the driver (tolerance_for: refresh-proof);
latency floors max(4x,100us); quick mode skips poll-bound mix
floors; both tolerance classes proven to bite
- proof: test_table wo_idx_probe suite (RED first), corpus
query-index-probe 105/0, full battery green, TSan clean, two
campaigns pass the refreshed baseline
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- worker DB builtins marshal to shard 0: requester-side slot encode
(VM heaps never read cross-shard), owner executes serialized in
adopt, reply unparks via new WO_PARK_INBOX park + envelope 3/4
- engine gains thread-agnostic slot entry points (insert_slots,
update_field_slot, val_encode/clone, wo_db_exec_req); traps and
messages byte-identical to the local path
- main.c: engine + replay boot BEFORE shards spawn; workers assert
rt.db/rt.wal NULL; busy shard adopts inbox once per slice
- latent stage-1 bug fixed: shared io_uring params static raced by
lazy worker init lost park wakes (~1/20 hangs); params per-vm,
short submit now fails loud
- new sample docs/examples/db-actor + just db-actor gate 8/0 (multi
x3, uring/epoll forced, single byte-exact, WAL replay pair);
ASan+TSan 6/6; full battery green
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Float full stack: literals (fraction/exponent; `0..10` still a range), f64
opcodes 34-41, @table column, WAL bit-exact replay, json fractions in and
shortest-round-trip out. IEEE-quiet — FDIV never traps where DIV does.
- Bytes: a wo_str with its own class id, so alloc/free/copy are shared but no
Text builtin accepts one; len/at/slice/eq/concat, base64 both ways, json
boundary as base64; TEXT_COPY preserves the kind.
- No implicit Int/Float mixing (WO-E201 in the typechecker, not the emitter,
which picks the opcode from one side and would misread the other).
- One IEEE deviation: float_cmp total order (NaN last, -0.0 == +0.0) for
indexes and order-by, keys canonicalized to match. `?Float` nil is a
reserved quiet NaN — the zero word is +0.0, WO_NIL_SCALAR's bits are -2.0.
- Renderer prefers fixed over exponential in 1e-6..1e21: pure shortest makes
a price of 900.0 read `9e+02`. One renderer for interp/json/float_to_text.
- Fixed en route: lexer double-counted the leading digit; is_scalar_shaped
took Float/Bytes as Int-shaped; Bytes ownership needed a shared heap-scalar
predicate or temps never dropped; order-by bit-compared negatives backwards.
- Iteration 17: `kind = "library"` (absent = program; bad value = WO-E109),
entry-less check mode retiring the `--emit` workaround, Go's `internal/` as
WO-E108 at the consumer's `use`. Driver-only; VM/.wob/GC untouched.
- Framework reorg: internal/{parse,serve}.wo; http/form.wo split out to keep
media_type/form_values public (parse.wo had grown public surface).
- Docs: link audit (97 -> 88 broken, conflict markers resolved, 2 duplicate
stories removed), 00-code-review verified 26/27, iterations re-sequenced.
- Also carries the pre-staged pub(read)/using/#if work from the index.
- Gates: corpus 103/0, test_wal 156/0, web-app 26/0, oop-accept ALL MET.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- FK restrict: deleting a row a non-nullable `ref` still points at traps
WO_T_FK (11), catchable. The compiler now records a `ref` field's
target class in the class-table field_class metadata; the engine
(wo_row_has_referrers) scans referencing scalar columns before a
delete. Correctness-first full scan; the backlink-index optimization
is recorded for later
- docs/examples/employee now COMPILES AND RUNS all six modes against a
WAL-durable database: seed (+@unique trap across restart), report
(per-dept aggregates + payroll), staff (unique probe + backlink +
ref nav), raise (update-through-row), drop (FK restrict), and
persistence via replay
- group-by SYNTAX parked to a future iteration (user decision): the
report mode is hand-rolled from the shipped primitives meanwhile
(same numbers). "table relations and FK" is complete
- scripts/employee-accept.sh (8 checks) + a `just employee` module;
manifest parser tolerates iteration 9c's [share]/[[share.clients]]
sections so `woc .` builds the sample on this branch
- fixtures trap/db-fk-restrict (code 11) + run/db-fk-restrict-catch;
oop-e2e 79/0, woc-test 566/0, 15 runtime suites, log-watcher 7/0,
employee-accept 8/0
- 9b story + status board updated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- DB_SCAN(64): class -> multi<Int> of every row id, materialized up
front (the 9b cursor-stability rule: the loop body point-reads, so a
row updated mid-loop cannot disturb iteration)
- DB_GET_FIELD(65): class,id,field -> the field decoded to a fresh VM
value (the out-gate copy); a table-class value IS its row id at
runtime, so this is how a compiled query reads a column, and a ref
field decodes to the target id for navigation
- DB_PROBE(66): class,index,key -> multi<Int> of ids whose first
indexed column equals key (backlink + indexed where)
- wo_val_decode_vm wrapper exposed; dispatch range 61..66, loader
arities, runner mirror updated
- 15 runtime suites green, oop-e2e 73/0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- wo_row_update_field: encode new value, unique re-check against a
shadow BEFORE any mutation (violating update leaves the row
untouched, DB_ERR_UNIQUE), index entries moved old-hash -> new-hash,
old engine value freed; proven by test_table (unique refusal keeps
the row, released key becomes insertable)
- WAL UPDATE record: full-row re-log, replay = replace (remove +
re-create same id); prefix/suffix delta recorded as later
optimization; test_wal replays insert+update to the updated state
- builtins 62 DB_UPDATE_FIELD (cid,id,field,value) and 63 DB_DELETE
(cid,id), commit-before-ack like insert, WO_T_UNIQUE/WO_T_DB/WO_T_IO
mapping; dispatch range 61..63; loader arities; runner mirror
- plan Task 5 marked superseded-in-part with the recorded deviation:
the language surface (reads, queries, row views, delete statement)
is 9b's, where the comprehension design put it -- no interim brace-
select grammar to retire later
- gates: test_table 839/0, test_wal 102/0, 15 suites, oop-e2e 73/0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- .wob v3: class records carry an index tail (flags bit0 = unique,
col_cnt, columns) -- @table(index:[a,b]) entries plus one unique
single-column entry per @unique field; loader validates columns in
range and scalar/Text-kinded; emitter validates the declarations
(unknown column, un-indexable kind => diagnostic)
- engine: db_index hash multimap per table, built from the class
table at first touch, maintained ONLY inside wo_row_insert/
wo_row_remove; unique checks re-compare actual column values (a
hash is a hint); replay re-indexes via wo_row_raw_commit AFTER
slots are filled, so recovered tables carry their indexes
- WO_T_UNIQUE = 10; a violating insert is un-applied whole (bitmap,
hash, count, and the never-observable id reclaimed) and traps
catchably -- the employee SEED-DUP pattern
- wo_row_insert gains err_kind so db.c maps UNIQUE/OOM/other to the
right trap; test images and the runner's loader mirror speak v3
- fixtures: trap/db-unique-violation (code 10 exact) and
run/db-unique-catch (catchable dup, composite index accepts
duplicates, next id dense after a refusal)
- gates: oop-e2e 73/0, all 15 runtime suites, woc-test green,
log-watcher 7/0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
