-- tls-client — runtime-v2 9 F3c-net's acceptance workload. An outbound HTTPS
-- client, written end to end in .wo: it dials a TLS 1.3 server with
-- `net.connect_tls`, which runs the hand-rolled handshake (X25519 + AES-GCM /
-- ChaCha20-Poly1305 + the RFC 8446 key schedule), validates the certificate
-- chain to a trust anchor and matches the hostname (SAN), then carries
-- application bytes over `net.write_tls` / `net.read_tls`.
--
--   woc --emit main.wo -o tls-client.wob
--   WO_CA_BUNDLE=ca.pem wovm tls-client.wob localhost 18443
--
-- A connection whose chain does not chain to a trusted anchor, whose SAN does
-- not match the host, or that is expired, is refused loudly (the connect traps,
-- caught here). The gate (scripts/tls-accept.sh, `just tls`) proves the happy
-- path and those negatives against a local stub — no live network.
use net

fn main(args: multi Text) -> Int {
  if len(args) < 2 {
    print_err("usage: tls-client <host> <port>");
    return 2;
  }
  let host = args[0];
  let port = parse_int(args[1]);
  if port == nil {
    print_err("tls-client: <port> must be a number");
    return 2;
  }

  -- connect_tls traps on DNS/connect/handshake/chain/hostname failure — a
  -- secure connection is never silently downgraded, so we catch and report.
  let fd = try net.connect_tls(host, port) catch (e) -1;
  if fd < 0 {
    print("tls: refused (handshake, chain, or hostname)");
    return 1;
  }

  net.write_tls(fd, "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: ${host}\r\n\r\n");

  let acc = "";
  while true {
    let chunk = try net.read_tls(fd, 4096) catch (e) "";
    if len(chunk) == 0 { break; }
    acc = acc .. chunk;
  }
  net.close(fd);

  print("recv ${len(acc)} bytes");
  print(acc);
  return 0;
}