shoney.arickathil
3a1ba15851
- crypto.c: x509_find_ext (generic extension walker) + wo_x509_basic_constraints (cA / pathLenConstraint, absent => not a CA) + wo_x509_eku_serverauth_ok (EKU absent, serverAuth, or anyEKU => usable; else not) - wo_tls_verify_chain enforces decision 6: the leaf must be server-usable (EKU), every server-sent issuer and the signing anchor must be a CA (basicConstraints CA:TRUE) with a pathLenConstraint covering the intermediates below it — stops a leaf masquerading as a CA - gen_x509.py extended (folds in the wildcard leaf, adds EKU clientAuth-only, EKU serverAuth, a non-CA intermediate + a leaf issued under it); vectors regenerated - KATs: extractors (test_crypto 104) + chain enforcement (test_tls 103) — EKU serverAuth accepted, clientAuth-only rejected, leaf-under-non-CA rejected though every signature verifies; existing chains still pass. ASan/UBSan clean Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> (cherry picked from commit 3811418014c2c8d9bc3a9464256f52104261b1b9)
382 lines
20 KiB
C
382 lines
20 KiB
C
/* test_tls.c — TLS 1.3 record layer (runtime-v2 9 phase F1). KAT against
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* python's AEAD as oracle (tls_record_vectors.h), plus seal/open round-trip,
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* a tamper-rejection, and the sequence-number nonce advancing. ASan/UBSan. */
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "tls.h"
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "t.h"
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#include "tls_record_vectors.h"
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#include "tls_hs_vectors.h"
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#include "tls_driver_vectors.h"
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#include "x509_vectors.h" /* phase-E RSA + EC chains, for chain validation */
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/* RFC 8448 §3 recorded ServerHello handshake message (90 octets). */
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#define SH_MSG "\x02\x00\x00\x56\x03\x03\xa6\xaf\x06\xa4\x12\x18\x60\xdc\x5e\x6e\x60\x24\x9c\xd3\x4c\x95\x93\x0c\x8a\xc5\xcb\x14\x34\xda\xc1\x55\x77\x2e\xd3\xe2\x69\x28\x00\x13\x01\x00\x00\x2e\x00\x33\x00\x24\x00\x1d\x00\x20\xc9\x82\x88\x76\x11\x20\x95\xfe\x66\x76\x2b\xdb\xf7\xc6\x72\xe1\x56\xd6\xcc\x25\x3b\x83\x3d\xf1\xdd\x69\xb1\xb0\x4e\x75\x1f\x0f\x00\x2b\x00\x02\x03\x04"
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#define SH_MSG_LEN 90
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/* naive subsequence search (test-only). */
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static int contains(const uint8_t *hay, size_t hn, const uint8_t *needle, size_t nn) {
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if (nn > hn) return 0;
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for (size_t i = 0; i + nn <= hn; i++)
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if (memcmp(hay + i, needle, nn) == 0) return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/* hex string -> bytes; returns the byte count. */
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static size_t unhex(const char *h, uint8_t *out) {
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size_t n = 0;
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for (; h[0] && h[1]; h += 2) {
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unsigned v;
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sscanf(h, "%2x", &v);
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out[n++] = (uint8_t)v;
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}
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return n;
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}
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int main(void) {
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uint8_t iv[12], aeskey[16], chakey[32], pt[TLSREC_PTLEN];
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memcpy(iv, TLSREC_IV, 12);
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memcpy(aeskey, TLSREC_AESKEY, 16);
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memcpy(chakey, TLSREC_CHAKEY, 32);
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memcpy(pt, TLSREC_PT, TLSREC_PTLEN);
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/* AES-128-GCM: sealed record must equal python's byte-for-byte. */
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{
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uint8_t out[TLSREC_PTLEN + WO_TLS_RECORD_OVERHEAD];
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int n = wo_tls_record_seal(WO_TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, aeskey, 16, iv,
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TLSREC_SEQ, TLSREC_CT, pt, TLSREC_PTLEN, out);
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T_CHECK(n == TLSREC_AESLEN);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(out, TLSREC_AES, TLSREC_AESLEN) == 0);
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}
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/* ChaCha20-Poly1305: same. */
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{
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uint8_t out[TLSREC_PTLEN + WO_TLS_RECORD_OVERHEAD];
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int n = wo_tls_record_seal(WO_TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, chakey, 32,
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iv, TLSREC_SEQ, TLSREC_CT, pt, TLSREC_PTLEN,
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out);
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T_CHECK(n == TLSREC_CHALEN);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(out, TLSREC_CHA, TLSREC_CHALEN) == 0);
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}
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/* open() recovers the record python sealed: content, type, length. */
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{
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uint8_t rec[TLSREC_AESLEN], out[TLSREC_AESLEN]; uint8_t ct = 0;
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memcpy(rec, TLSREC_AES, TLSREC_AESLEN);
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int n = wo_tls_record_open(WO_TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, aeskey, 16, iv,
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TLSREC_SEQ, rec, TLSREC_AESLEN, out, &ct);
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T_CHECK(n == TLSREC_PTLEN);
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T_CHECK(ct == TLSREC_CT);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(out, pt, TLSREC_PTLEN) == 0);
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}
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/* Round-trip both suites over several sequence numbers (nonce advances). */
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for (int suite = 1; suite <= 2; suite++) {
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const uint8_t *k = suite == WO_TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ? aeskey : chakey;
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size_t kl = suite == WO_TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ? 16 : 32;
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for (uint64_t seq = 0; seq < 5; seq++) {
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uint8_t msg[40], rec[40 + WO_TLS_RECORD_OVERHEAD];
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uint8_t got[sizeof rec]; uint8_t ct = 0;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof msg; i++) msg[i] = (uint8_t)(i + seq);
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int n = wo_tls_record_seal(suite, k, kl, iv, seq,
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WO_TLS_CT_APPLICATION_DATA, msg,
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sizeof msg, rec);
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T_CHECK(n > 0);
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int m = wo_tls_record_open(suite, k, kl, iv, seq, rec, (size_t)n,
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got, &ct);
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T_CHECK(m == (int)sizeof msg);
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T_CHECK(ct == WO_TLS_CT_APPLICATION_DATA);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(got, msg, sizeof msg) == 0);
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}
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}
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/* A tampered record fails to open; a wrong sequence number fails too. */
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{
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uint8_t rec[TLSREC_AESLEN], out[TLSREC_AESLEN]; uint8_t ct = 0;
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memcpy(rec, TLSREC_AES, TLSREC_AESLEN);
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rec[10] ^= 0x01;
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_record_open(WO_TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, aeskey, 16, iv,
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TLSREC_SEQ, rec, TLSREC_AESLEN, out, &ct) == -1);
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memcpy(rec, TLSREC_AES, TLSREC_AESLEN);
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_record_open(WO_TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, aeskey, 16, iv,
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TLSREC_SEQ + 1, rec, TLSREC_AESLEN, out,
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&ct) == -1);
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/* A length-field lie is rejected before the AEAD. */
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memcpy(rec, TLSREC_AES, TLSREC_AESLEN);
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rec[4] ^= 0x01;
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_record_open(WO_TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, aeskey, 16, iv,
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TLSREC_SEQ, rec, TLSREC_AESLEN, out, &ct) == -1);
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}
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/* A bad suite id is rejected, not misdispatched. */
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{
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uint8_t out[64];
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_record_seal(99, aeskey, 16, iv, 0, 23, pt, TLSREC_PTLEN,
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out) == -1);
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}
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/* Key schedule (phase F2) against RFC 8448 §3 "Simple 1-RTT Handshake". */
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{
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uint8_t ecdhe[32], hash_ch_sh[32], hash_ch_sf[32];
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uint8_t c_hs[32], s_hs[32], c_ap[32], s_ap[32], master[32];
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uint8_t s_hs_key[16], s_hs_iv[12];
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unhex("8bd4054fb55b9d63fdfbacf9f04b9f0d35e6d63f537563efd46272900f89492d", ecdhe);
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unhex("860c06edc07858ee8e78f0e7428c58edd6b43f2ca3e6e95f02ed063cf0e1cad8", hash_ch_sh);
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unhex("9608102a0f1ccc6db6250b7b7e417b1a000eaada3daae4777a7686c9ff83df13", hash_ch_sf);
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unhex("b3eddb126e067f35a780b3abf45e2d8f3b1a950738f52e9600746a0e27a55a21", c_hs);
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unhex("b67b7d690cc16c4e75e54213cb2d37b4e9c912bcded9105d42befd59d391ad38", s_hs);
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unhex("18df06843d13a08bf2a449844c5f8a478001bc4d4c627984d5a41da8d0402919", master);
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unhex("9e40646ce79a7f9dc05af8889bce6552875afa0b06df0087f792ebb7c17504a5", c_ap);
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unhex("a11af9f05531f856ad47116b45a950328204b4f44bfb6b3a4b4f1f3fcb631643", s_ap);
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unhex("3fce516009c21727d0f2e4e86ee403bc", s_hs_key);
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unhex("5d313eb2671276ee13000b30", s_hs_iv);
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wo_tls_key_schedule ks;
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wo_tls_derive_handshake(&ks, ecdhe, 32, hash_ch_sh);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(ks.client_hs_traffic, c_hs, 32) == 0);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(ks.server_hs_traffic, s_hs, 32) == 0);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(ks.master_secret, master, 32) == 0);
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wo_tls_derive_application(&ks, hash_ch_sf);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(ks.client_ap_traffic, c_ap, 32) == 0);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(ks.server_ap_traffic, s_ap, 32) == 0);
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/* Traffic key + iv from the server hs traffic secret. */
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uint8_t k[16], vv[12];
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wo_tls_traffic_keys(ks.server_hs_traffic, 16, k, vv);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(k, s_hs_key, 16) == 0);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(vv, s_hs_iv, 12) == 0);
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}
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/* ServerHello parser (phase F3) against the RFC 8448 recorded message. */
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{
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uint8_t sh[SH_MSG_LEN]; memcpy(sh, SH_MSG, SH_MSG_LEN);
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int suite = 0; uint8_t spub[32];
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_parse_server_hello(sh, SH_MSG_LEN, &suite, spub) == 0);
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T_CHECK(suite == WO_TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256); /* 0x1301 */
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uint8_t want_spub[32];
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unhex("c9828876112095fe66762bdbf7c672e156d6cc253b833df1dd69b1b04e751f0f", want_spub);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(spub, want_spub, 32) == 0);
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/* Malformed inputs are rejected, never over-read. */
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_parse_server_hello(sh, 10, &suite, spub) == -1); /* truncated */
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uint8_t bad[SH_MSG_LEN]; memcpy(bad, SH_MSG, SH_MSG_LEN);
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bad[0] = 0x01; /* wrong handshake type */
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_parse_server_hello(bad, SH_MSG_LEN, &suite, spub) == -1);
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memcpy(bad, SH_MSG, SH_MSG_LEN);
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bad[39] = 0x02; /* cipher suite 0x1302 unsupported */
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_parse_server_hello(bad, SH_MSG_LEN, &suite, spub) == -1);
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}
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/* ClientHello builder (phase F3): structural checks + SNI/keyshare present. */
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{
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uint8_t cpub[32], rnd[32], sid[32];
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for (int j = 0; j < 32; j++) { cpub[j] = (uint8_t)j; rnd[j] = (uint8_t)(j + 1); sid[j] = (uint8_t)(j + 2); }
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const char *host = "api.anthropic.com";
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uint8_t ch[512]; size_t chl = 0;
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_build_client_hello(host, strlen(host), cpub, rnd, sid,
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ch, sizeof ch, &chl) == 0);
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T_CHECK(ch[0] == 1); /* client_hello */
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size_t declared = ((size_t)ch[1] << 16) | ((size_t)ch[2] << 8) | ch[3];
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T_CHECK(declared == chl - 4); /* length field consistent */
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T_CHECK(contains(ch, chl, (const uint8_t *)host, strlen(host))); /* SNI */
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T_CHECK(contains(ch, chl, cpub, 32)); /* x25519 key share */
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/* Our ServerHello parser must not accept a ClientHello. */
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int suite; uint8_t spub[32];
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_parse_server_hello(ch, chl, &suite, spub) == -1);
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/* Too-small buffer refuses cleanly. */
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uint8_t tiny[32]; size_t tl;
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_build_client_hello(host, strlen(host), cpub, rnd, sid,
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tiny, sizeof tiny, &tl) == -1);
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}
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/* Full offline handshake verification (phase F3b) against RFC 8448 §3:
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* CertificateVerify (RSA-PSS), server Finished, and the client Finished we
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* would send — driven from the recorded handshake messages. */
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{
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/* running transcripts over the recorded handshake messages */
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uint8_t buf[2048]; size_t n = 0;
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#define ADD(a) do { memcpy(buf + n, a, sizeof a); n += sizeof a; } while (0)
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uint8_t th_cert[32], th_cv[32], th_sf[32];
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n = 0; ADD(hs_ch); ADD(hs_sh); ADD(hs_ee); ADD(hs_cert);
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wo_sha256(buf, n, th_cert); /* CH..Certificate */
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memcpy(buf + n, hs_cv, sizeof hs_cv); n += sizeof hs_cv;
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wo_sha256(buf, n, th_cv); /* CH..CertificateVerify */
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memcpy(buf + n, hs_sfin, sizeof hs_sfin); n += sizeof hs_sfin;
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wo_sha256(buf, n, th_sf); /* CH..server Finished */
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#undef ADD
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/* leaf cert out of the Certificate message; sig out of CertificateVerify */
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size_t p = 4; p += 1 + hs_cert[4]; /* skip ctx (len 0) */
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p += 3; /* cert_list length */
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size_t clen = ((size_t)hs_cert[p] << 16) | ((size_t)hs_cert[p+1] << 8) | hs_cert[p+2];
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p += 3;
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const uint8_t *leaf = hs_cert + p;
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uint16_t scheme = ((uint16_t)hs_cv[4] << 8) | hs_cv[5];
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size_t siglen = ((size_t)hs_cv[6] << 8) | hs_cv[7];
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const uint8_t *sig = hs_cv + 8;
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T_CHECK(scheme == 0x0804); /* rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 */
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_cert_verify(leaf, clen, scheme, sig, siglen, th_cert) == 1);
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/* wrong transcript hash and tampered signature both reject */
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uint8_t bad_th[32]; memcpy(bad_th, th_cert, 32); bad_th[0] ^= 1;
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_cert_verify(leaf, clen, scheme, sig, siglen, bad_th) == 0);
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uint8_t bad_sig[256]; memcpy(bad_sig, sig, siglen); bad_sig[5] ^= 1;
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_cert_verify(leaf, clen, scheme, bad_sig, siglen, th_cert) == 0);
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/* a scheme that mismatches the RSA leaf key is refused */
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_cert_verify(leaf, clen, 0x0403, sig, siglen, th_cert) == 0);
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/* server Finished: recompute verify_data, compare to the recorded value
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* (skip the 4-byte handshake header). */
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uint8_t vd[32];
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wo_tls_finished_verify(hs_s_traffic, th_cv, vd);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(vd, hs_sfin + 4, 32) == 0);
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/* client Finished we would send matches the recorded one. */
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wo_tls_finished_verify(hs_c_traffic, th_sf, vd);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(vd, hs_cfin + 4, 32) == 0);
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}
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/* Sans-io client driver (phase F3c): the whole handshake driven offline
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* against the RFC 8448 record trace, then application data both ways. */
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{
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static wo_tls_client c; /* ~40 KB — keep off the stack */
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uint8_t priv[32], ch[256];
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memcpy(priv, drv_client_priv, 32);
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memcpy(ch, drv_ch_msg, sizeof drv_ch_msg);
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_client_start_with(&c, ch, sizeof drv_ch_msg, priv) == 0);
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/* it framed a ClientHello record to send */
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uint8_t sent[512];
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size_t sn = wo_tls_client_take_output(&c, sent, sizeof sent);
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T_CHECK(sn == 5 + sizeof drv_ch_msg && sent[0] == 22);
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uint8_t rsh[128]; memcpy(rsh, drv_rec_sh, sizeof drv_rec_sh);
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_client_push_record(&c, rsh, sizeof drv_rec_sh) == WO_TLS_WANT_MORE);
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uint8_t rfl[1024]; memcpy(rfl, drv_rec_flight, sizeof drv_rec_flight);
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_client_push_record(&c, rfl, sizeof drv_rec_flight) == WO_TLS_ESTABLISHED);
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/* the client Finished record we emit matches RFC 8448 byte-for-byte */
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uint8_t fin[128];
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size_t fn = wo_tls_client_take_output(&c, fin, sizeof fin);
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T_CHECK(fn == sizeof drv_rec_cfin);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(fin, drv_rec_cfin, sizeof drv_rec_cfin) == 0);
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/* application encrypt: our first app record equals the recorded one */
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uint8_t app[128];
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int an = wo_tls_client_encrypt(&c, drv_capp_pt, sizeof drv_capp_pt, app, sizeof app);
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T_CHECK(an == (int)sizeof drv_rec_capp);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(app, drv_rec_capp, sizeof drv_rec_capp) == 0);
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/* server sends NewSessionTicket first (server app seq 0) — decrypt it
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* (a post-handshake handshake message), advancing the read seq. */
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uint8_t nst[256]; uint8_t ct2 = 0;
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memcpy(nst, drv_rec_nst, sizeof drv_rec_nst);
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int nn = wo_tls_client_decrypt(&c, nst, sizeof drv_rec_nst, nst, sizeof nst, &ct2);
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T_CHECK(nn > 0 && ct2 == 22); /* handshake (ticket) */
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/* then the server's application data (seq 1) decrypts to the plaintext */
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uint8_t sapp[128]; uint8_t ct3 = 0;
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int dn = wo_tls_client_decrypt(&c, drv_rec_sapp, sizeof drv_rec_sapp,
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sapp, sizeof sapp, &ct3);
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T_CHECK(dn == (int)sizeof drv_sapp_pt && ct3 == 23);
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T_CHECK(memcmp(sapp, drv_sapp_pt, sizeof drv_sapp_pt) == 0);
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}
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/* Driver rejects a tampered server flight (auth failure -> FAILED). */
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{
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static wo_tls_client c;
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uint8_t priv[32], ch[256];
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memcpy(priv, drv_client_priv, 32); memcpy(ch, drv_ch_msg, sizeof drv_ch_msg);
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wo_tls_client_start_with(&c, ch, sizeof drv_ch_msg, priv);
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uint8_t rsh[128]; memcpy(rsh, drv_rec_sh, sizeof drv_rec_sh);
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wo_tls_client_push_record(&c, rsh, sizeof drv_rec_sh);
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uint8_t rfl[1024]; memcpy(rfl, drv_rec_flight, sizeof drv_rec_flight);
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rfl[100] ^= 0x01; /* corrupt the ciphertext */
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_client_push_record(&c, rfl, sizeof drv_rec_flight) == WO_TLS_FAILED);
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}
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/* Hostname enforcement: with a host set, the RFC 8448 leaf (which carries
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* no SAN) is refused at the Certificate step. */
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{
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static wo_tls_client c;
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uint8_t priv[32], ch[256];
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memcpy(priv, drv_client_priv, 32); memcpy(ch, drv_ch_msg, sizeof drv_ch_msg);
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wo_tls_client_start_with(&c, ch, sizeof drv_ch_msg, priv);
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wo_tls_client_set_host(&c, "api.anthropic.com", 17);
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uint8_t rsh[128]; memcpy(rsh, drv_rec_sh, sizeof drv_rec_sh);
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wo_tls_client_push_record(&c, rsh, sizeof drv_rec_sh);
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uint8_t rfl[1024]; memcpy(rfl, drv_rec_flight, sizeof drv_rec_flight);
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_client_push_record(&c, rfl, sizeof drv_rec_flight) == WO_TLS_FAILED);
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}
|
|
|
|
/* Certificate chain validation (phase F3c-net security core) with the
|
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* phase-E RSA + EC chains (kat_rsa_ca signs kat_rsa_leaf, SAN
|
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* leaf.example.com; kat_ec_ca signs kat_ec_leaf, SAN leaf.example.org). */
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|
{
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const char *NOW = "20250101000000"; /* inside 2020..2030 */
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const uint8_t *leaf1[] = { kat_rsa_leaf };
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size_t leaf1n[] = { sizeof kat_rsa_leaf };
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const uint8_t *rsa_anchor[] = { kat_rsa_ca };
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size_t rsa_anchor_n[] = { sizeof kat_rsa_ca };
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const uint8_t *ec_anchor[] = { kat_ec_ca };
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size_t ec_anchor_n[] = { sizeof kat_ec_ca };
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|
|
|
/* leaf trusted via its issuing CA anchor + host + validity */
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T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(leaf1, leaf1n, 1, rsa_anchor, rsa_anchor_n, 1,
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|
"leaf.example.com", 16, NOW) == 1);
|
|
/* wrong anchor (EC CA did not sign the RSA leaf) -> untrusted */
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|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(leaf1, leaf1n, 1, ec_anchor, ec_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
"leaf.example.com", 16, NOW) == 0);
|
|
/* wrong host -> reject */
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|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(leaf1, leaf1n, 1, rsa_anchor, rsa_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
"evil.example.com", 16, NOW) == 0);
|
|
/* expired (before validity) -> reject */
|
|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(leaf1, leaf1n, 1, rsa_anchor, rsa_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
"leaf.example.com", 16, "20190101000000") == 0);
|
|
/* NULL host skips the SAN check (still trusted) */
|
|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(leaf1, leaf1n, 1, rsa_anchor, rsa_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
NULL, 0, NOW) == 1);
|
|
|
|
/* two-cert chain [leaf, ca] with the CA also supplied as the anchor:
|
|
* links leaf->ca and the top (ca) equals the anchor verbatim. */
|
|
const uint8_t *chain2[] = { kat_rsa_leaf, kat_rsa_ca };
|
|
size_t chain2n[] = { sizeof kat_rsa_leaf, sizeof kat_rsa_ca };
|
|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(chain2, chain2n, 2, rsa_anchor, rsa_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
"leaf.example.com", 16, NOW) == 1);
|
|
/* a broken link (leaf not signed by an unrelated top) -> reject */
|
|
const uint8_t *badchain[] = { kat_rsa_leaf, kat_ec_ca };
|
|
size_t badchainn[] = { sizeof kat_rsa_leaf, sizeof kat_ec_ca };
|
|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(badchain, badchainn, 2, rsa_anchor, rsa_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
"leaf.example.com", 16, NOW) == 0);
|
|
|
|
/* EC chain trusts via its EC CA */
|
|
const uint8_t *ecleaf[] = { kat_ec_leaf };
|
|
size_t ecleafn[] = { sizeof kat_ec_leaf };
|
|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(ecleaf, ecleafn, 1, ec_anchor, ec_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
"leaf.example.org", 16, NOW) == 1);
|
|
/* no anchors -> never trusted */
|
|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(leaf1, leaf1n, 1, NULL, NULL, 0,
|
|
"leaf.example.com", 16, NOW) == 0);
|
|
|
|
/* decision 6 — EKU: a leaf with EKU serverAuth is accepted; one with
|
|
* clientAuth-only is rejected even though its signature is valid. */
|
|
const uint8_t *ekuS[] = { kat_leaf_eku_server };
|
|
size_t ekuSn[] = { sizeof kat_leaf_eku_server };
|
|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(ekuS, ekuSn, 1, rsa_anchor, rsa_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
"leaf.example.com", 16, NOW) == 1);
|
|
const uint8_t *ekuC[] = { kat_leaf_eku_client };
|
|
size_t ekuCn[] = { sizeof kat_leaf_eku_client };
|
|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(ekuC, ekuCn, 1, rsa_anchor, rsa_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
"leaf.example.com", 16, NOW) == 0);
|
|
|
|
/* decision 6 — basicConstraints: a leaf issued under a non-CA
|
|
* intermediate is rejected, though every signature verifies. */
|
|
const uint8_t *nocaChain[] = { kat_leaf_under_noca, kat_noca_mid };
|
|
size_t nocaChainN[] = { sizeof kat_leaf_under_noca, sizeof kat_noca_mid };
|
|
T_CHECK(wo_tls_verify_chain(nocaChain, nocaChainN, 2, rsa_anchor, rsa_anchor_n, 1,
|
|
"leaf.example.com", 16, NOW) == 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return t_report("test_tls");
|
|
}
|