writeonce/runtime/src/tls.h
shoney.arickathil d7e7eff6b5 feat(tls): sans-io TLS 1.3 client handshake driver (rv2 9 phase F3c-core)
- wo_tls_client: a pure state machine (no sockets). Caller frames
  records; driver runs ClientHello->ServerHello->flight->Finished and
  hands back bytes to send. Keeps all I/O out of the security-critical FSM
- start_with (inject CH + ephemeral priv), push_record, take_output,
  encrypt/decrypt (application traffic keys). Handshake-message reassembly
  across records; per-message transcript timing (CertVerify signs CH..Cert,
  Finished MACs CH..CertVerify); constant-time Finished compare; every
  failure lands in FAILED (no warn-and-continue)
- verifies server CertificateVerify (phase E+D) + server Finished, emits
  the client Finished, switches to application keys
- KAT: whole handshake driven offline against the RFC 8448 record trace —
  client Finished record byte-for-byte, first client app record
  byte-for-byte, NewSessionTicket + server app data decrypt to plaintext,
  tampered flight -> FAILED. test_tls 90 pass, ASan/UBSan clean
- SECURITY TODO before live use (documented in tls.h + story): chain walk
  to a trust anchor + SAN/hostname match; random ephemeral for production
  start; the net.connect_tls socket glue

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 74c332d7efdb8bbfdbe90bd2fcc3defa2fe8da00)
2026-09-15 01:15:31 +02:00

176 lines
9 KiB
C

/* tls.h — hand-rolled TLS 1.3 (runtime-v2 9 phase F). Sits on the crypto
* ladder (crypto.h): AEAD (A), HKDF (B), X25519 (C), signatures (D), X.509
* (E). This header is phase F: the record layer first, the handshake FSM and
* net.connect_tls on top. Internal C; the VM enters through net builtins. */
#ifndef WO_TLS_H
#define WO_TLS_H
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* The two SHA-256 TLS 1.3 cipher suites we implement. AES-128-GCM is
* mandatory-to-implement (RFC 8446 §9.1); ChaCha20-Poly1305 is the portable
* fallback when the CPU has no AES-NI. AES-256-GCM uses SHA-384 and is a later
* add (the HKDF is SHA-256 today). */
enum {
WO_TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 1,
WO_TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = 2,
};
/* TLS 1.3 record content types (RFC 8446 §5.1). */
enum {
WO_TLS_CT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC = 20,
WO_TLS_CT_ALERT = 21,
WO_TLS_CT_HANDSHAKE = 22,
WO_TLS_CT_APPLICATION_DATA = 23,
};
/* Overhead a sealed record adds over its plaintext: 5-byte header + 1-byte
* inner content-type + 16-byte AEAD tag. */
#define WO_TLS_RECORD_OVERHEAD 22
/* Seal one TLS 1.3 record (RFC 8446 §5.2). Writes the full wire record —
* 5-byte header || encrypted (TLSInnerPlaintext) || 16-byte tag — into out,
* which must hold at least ptlen + WO_TLS_RECORD_OVERHEAD bytes. `seq` is the
* record sequence number; the per-record nonce is iv XOR seq (big-endian, §5.3).
* No padding. Returns the record length, or -1 on a bad suite. */
int wo_tls_record_seal(int suite, const uint8_t *key, size_t keylen,
const uint8_t iv[12], uint64_t seq, uint8_t content_type,
const uint8_t *pt, size_t ptlen, uint8_t *out);
/* Open one TLS 1.3 record. `rec` is the full wire record (header included),
* reclen its length. Writes the recovered content into out (must hold
* reclen bytes) and the recovered inner content-type into *content_type,
* after stripping trailing zero padding (§5.2/§5.4). Returns the content
* length, or -1 on a malformed record or AEAD authentication failure. */
int wo_tls_record_open(int suite, const uint8_t *key, size_t keylen,
const uint8_t iv[12], uint64_t seq, const uint8_t *rec,
size_t reclen, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *content_type);
/* ---- key schedule (phase F2, RFC 8446 §7.1, SHA-256) --------------------- */
/* The traffic secrets the handshake derives, in the order they become known. */
typedef struct {
uint8_t handshake_secret[32];
uint8_t master_secret[32];
uint8_t client_hs_traffic[32];
uint8_t server_hs_traffic[32];
uint8_t client_ap_traffic[32];
uint8_t server_ap_traffic[32];
} wo_tls_key_schedule;
/* Handshake-phase secrets from the ECDHE shared secret and the
* ClientHello..ServerHello transcript hash. Fills handshake_secret, the two
* hs-traffic secrets, and master_secret (which needs no further transcript). */
void wo_tls_derive_handshake(wo_tls_key_schedule *ks, const uint8_t *ecdhe,
size_t ecdhe_len, const uint8_t hash_ch_sh[32]);
/* Application-phase traffic secrets from master_secret (already in ks) and the
* ClientHello..server-Finished transcript hash. */
void wo_tls_derive_application(wo_tls_key_schedule *ks,
const uint8_t hash_ch_sf[32]);
/* Per-direction AEAD key (key_len 16 or 32) and 12-byte IV from a traffic
* secret (HKDF-Expand-Label "key"/"iv"). */
void wo_tls_traffic_keys(const uint8_t traffic_secret[32], size_t key_len,
uint8_t *key, uint8_t iv[12]);
/* Finished verify_data = HMAC(HKDF-Expand-Label(base_key,"finished","",32),
* transcript_hash). Same routine builds and checks it (compare with ct_memeq). */
void wo_tls_finished_verify(const uint8_t base_key[32],
const uint8_t transcript_hash[32], uint8_t out[32]);
/* ---- handshake messages (phase F3, RFC 8446 §4) -------------------------- */
/* Parse a ServerHello handshake message (bytes start at the handshake type
* 0x02). Fills *suite (a WO_TLS_* enum) and the server's 32-byte X25519 key
* share. Returns 0, or -1 on any malformation, an unsupported suite/group, or
* a HelloRetryRequest. */
int wo_tls_parse_server_hello(const uint8_t *msg, size_t len, int *suite,
uint8_t server_pub[32]);
/* Verify a server CertificateVerify (RFC 8446 §4.4.3) against the leaf
* certificate DER, given the negotiated signature_scheme wire value, the
* signature, and the running transcript hash (ClientHello..Certificate). Only
* rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 (0x0804), rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (0x0401) and
* ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (0x0403) are accepted, and the scheme must match the
* leaf key type. Returns 1 valid, 0 otherwise. */
int wo_tls_verify_cert_verify(const uint8_t *leaf_der, size_t leaf_len,
uint16_t sig_scheme, const uint8_t *sig,
size_t sig_len, const uint8_t transcript_hash[32]);
/* Build a ClientHello handshake message offering TLS 1.3 / x25519 /
* RSA-PSS+RSA-PKCS1+ECDSA-P256, for `hostname` (SNI). random32 and the 32-byte
* legacy session_id are caller-supplied. Writes into out (cap outcap); *outlen
* gets the length. Returns 0, or -1 if the buffer is too small. */
int wo_tls_build_client_hello(const char *hostname, size_t hostlen,
const uint8_t client_pub[32],
const uint8_t random32[32],
const uint8_t session_id[32], uint8_t *out,
size_t outcap, size_t *outlen);
/* ---- sans-io client handshake driver (phase F3c) -------------------------
* A pure state machine: no sockets. The caller frames TLS records (read the
* 5-byte header, then that many bytes) and feeds whole records in; the driver
* advances the handshake and hands back bytes to send. This keeps every I/O
* concern out of the security-critical FSM, so it is fully testable offline
* (KAT'd against the RFC 8448 record trace).
*
* SECURITY NOTE — not yet a safe live client: this core verifies the server's
* CertificateVerify and Finished (proving possession of the leaf key) but does
* NOT yet walk the certificate chain to a trust anchor or match the hostname
* against the cert SAN. Those (the deferred phase-E bits) MUST land before this
* drives a real connection, or the client is open to MITM. It is currently an
* internal building block; net.connect_tls is not wired to it. */
#define WO_TLS_BUF_MAX 16384u /* transcript / reassembly cap (RFC 8448 fits) */
#define WO_TLS_LEAF_MAX 8192u /* largest leaf certificate accepted */
typedef enum {
WO_TLS_WANT_MORE = 0, /* need another record */
WO_TLS_ESTABLISHED = 1, /* handshake done; output holds client Finished */
WO_TLS_FAILED = -1, /* verification/parse failure — connection dead */
} wo_tls_status;
typedef struct {
int suite;
size_t keylen; /* AEAD key length, 16 or 32 */
uint8_t client_priv[32], client_pub[32];
wo_tls_key_schedule ks;
/* current read/write record protection (handshake, then application) */
uint8_t rd_key[32], rd_iv[12], wr_key[32], wr_iv[12];
uint64_t rd_seq, wr_seq;
uint8_t transcript[WO_TLS_BUF_MAX]; size_t tlen;
uint8_t hsbuf[WO_TLS_BUF_MAX]; size_t hsn; /* reassembled handshake bytes */
uint8_t leaf[WO_TLS_LEAF_MAX]; size_t leaflen;
uint16_t cv_scheme;
uint8_t out[1024]; size_t outn; /* bytes for the caller to send */
int st; /* internal FSM state */
} wo_tls_client;
/* Start a handshake from a caller-built ClientHello handshake message and a
* fixed X25519 private key (production passes fresh randomness; the KAT injects
* the RFC's). Frames the ClientHello into a plaintext record in c->out for the
* caller to send, and seeds the transcript. 0 ok, -1 on a buffer problem. */
int wo_tls_client_start_with(wo_tls_client *c, const uint8_t *ch_msg,
size_t ch_len, const uint8_t priv[32]);
/* Feed one whole TLS record. Advances the FSM. Returns WANT_MORE (need the
* next record), ESTABLISHED (handshake complete — drain c->out for the client
* Finished, then use the encrypt/decrypt calls), or FAILED. */
wo_tls_status wo_tls_client_push_record(wo_tls_client *c, const uint8_t *rec,
size_t reclen);
/* Copy out (and clear) the bytes the driver wants sent. Returns the count. */
size_t wo_tls_client_take_output(wo_tls_client *c, uint8_t *out, size_t outcap);
/* Application data, post-handshake (application traffic keys). encrypt writes a
* full record into out; decrypt reads one record and yields the plaintext plus
* its inner content type. Return the byte count, or -1 on overflow / auth
* failure. */
int wo_tls_client_encrypt(wo_tls_client *c, const uint8_t *data, size_t len,
uint8_t *out, size_t outcap);
int wo_tls_client_decrypt(wo_tls_client *c, const uint8_t *rec, size_t reclen,
uint8_t *out, size_t outcap, uint8_t *content_type);
#endif