- promotes 9c's identity fork to its own iteration: program identity
is a keypair (first-boot generated into WO_DATA, 0600, printable
fingerprint); A's [share] grants name PUBLIC KEYS, B pins A's key
in [connect.a]; mutual challenge-response, fresh nonces, transcript-
hash signing (protocol tag + fingerprints + nonces + channel)
- acceptance criteria: registered-key attach carries 9c rights
unchanged; unregistered key refused pre-statement with fingerprint
logged; same-uid-wrong-key refused (uid SUPERSEDED, not
supplemented); impostor on A's socket path aborted by B's pinned-key
check; handshake replay refused; rotation = manifest change
- four forks recorded: crypto provenance (lean: vendored compact
Ed25519 as the one sanctioned vendored component), keygen home
(lean: first-boot into WO_DATA), signed-transcript layout, uid
survival (lean: keys only, peer-cred demoted to log enrichment)
- out of scope: transport encryption, CA machinery, key escrow,
root-attacker protection
- plan folds into 9c's when specced (neither ships alone); 9c fork 3
marked superseded-as-end-state; roadmap + board rows added
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
shoney.arickathil
fe56ba0944