- SHA-1 (WS-handshake hard req, RFC 6455 worked example as acceptance), SHA-256, HMAC-SHA256 over Bytes; hand-rolled C per doctrine, FIPS/RFC vector fixtures; four forks recorded (namespace, shape, source, file) - gates chain item 24; digest floor for held 21 + ETag row; 24's dependency note repointed; board + table rows (held seqs bumped) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
4.6 KiB
| iteration | status |
|---|---|
| 34 | refine |
Iteration 34 — crypto builtins: digests and HMAC in the runtime
Format: fiberloom
product/story-iteration-template. Part of Story — one language, one runtime, one database, one binary.Inserted 2026-08-22 — the framework ledger's oldest unowned gap gets an owner. The language has NO bitwise operators (a settled surface decision), so digests cannot be written in
.wo; the ledger's recorded resolution stands: hand-rolled C builtins in the runtime — the libc-only doctrine permits hand-rolled crypto, and the code is bounded and well-specified. Off the concurrency chain but gates chain position 4: iteration 24's WebSocket handshake needs SHA-1 before chat can land.
Why this iteration exists
Four consumers already wait on it, none able to proceed:
iteration 24's upgrade handshake
(Sec-WebSocket-Accept = base64(SHA-1(key + GUID)) — SHA-1
specifically, not a choice); the framework's ETag/conditional-request
row (wants a content hash); HMAC-signed tokens the auth core can grow;
and held iteration 21, whose
challenge–response needs primitives that "do not exist" (its demotion
note). Bytes and base64 landed with iteration 19 — the carriers exist,
only the digests are missing.
Goals
- Digest builtins over Bytes: SHA-1 (the WS handshake's hard
requirement), SHA-256 (the modern default for ETag/HMAC), each
Bytes -> Bytes, streaming not required (whole-value, like every existing builtin). - HMAC-SHA256 (
key: Bytes, msg: Bytes -> Bytes) — the one composition real services need (signed tokens, webhook signatures); writing HMAC in.wois impossible for the same no-bitwise reason. - Test vectors are the acceptance: FIPS 180 / RFC 2202 / RFC 4231 vectors in a corpus fixture — a digest that "looks right" is worth nothing.
- The contract doc row: names, arities, Bytes-in/Bytes-out, and the explicit note that SHA-1 exists for protocol compatibility (WS), not for new designs.
Acceptance Criteria (draft — the spec refines)
- Given the published test vectors for SHA-1, SHA-256, and HMAC-SHA256, when the corpus fixture runs them through the builtins, then every output matches byte-for-byte (via the existing base64/Bytes surface).
- Given the WS handshake's worked example from RFC 6455
(
dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==→s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo=), when composed in pure.wofromsha1+base64_encode, then the exact accept token comes out — iteration 24's handshake is provably one expression away. - Given the full battery, when it runs, then nothing
regresses — new builtin ids only, no opcode, no
.wobversion bump (the iteration-19/time.ticksprecedent).
Out Of Scope
- Asymmetric crypto (ed25519 signatures/keypairs) — held iteration 21's spec decides what it needs when it unholds; this iteration lays the digest floor it will stand on.
- TLS — permanently the proxy's job (framework doctrine).
- CRC32 — the ledger lists it, but no consumer is blocked on it; it joins only if 24's spec finds a real need (rejecting speculative surface).
- A password-hashing story (bcrypt/argon2) — no workload asks yet.
- Bitwise operators in the language — a separate, bigger surface decision this iteration deliberately routes around.
Info
Forks the spec must settle:
- The namespace. The reserved stdlib namespaces are exactly
fs/proc/net/time/json/env(compiler-enforced list) — a newcryptonamespace touches that list plus the typechecker table, or the functions ride an existing namespace. Leaning: a realcryptonamespace (the list exists to be grown deliberately; this is deliberate). - Surface shape:
crypto.sha1(b: Bytes) -> Bytes,crypto.sha256(b: Bytes) -> Bytes,crypto.hmac_sha256(key: Bytes, msg: Bytes) -> Bytes— Text convenience overloads rejected (the caller hasbytes_of_text). - Implementation source: hand-rolled C from the FIPS pseudocode (~200 lines for both digests; well-trodden, vector-verified) — the doctrine's shape. No linking against OpenSSL, ever.
- Where the code lives:
runtime/src/crypto.cbeside sysio, or inside builtin.c — file layout, the executor decides.
Proposed Solution
Brainstorm → (small) spec settling the four forks → implement with the
time.ticks slice's shape (ids, one table row per compiler surface,
contract-doc rows, vector fixtures). Lands any time before iteration
24's spec; independent of 31/22/23.