writeonce/docs/examples/employee-list/README.md
shoney.arickathil 2e1041daed docs: employee-list sample -- program B's manifest pair (9c/9d target)
- docs/examples/employee-list: attaches to the running employee
  program; modes list / report (byte-identical to A's own) /
  staff <dept> / probe-write (registered read-only, insert must trap
  access-denied, exit 4, A unchanged)
- the manifests ARE the design, written as a pair: A's [share] gains
  listen = unix socket beside WO_DATA plus [[share.clients]] naming
  B's public-key fingerprint with rights = "read"; B's
  [connect.employee] carries A's ipc string, A's PINNED fingerprint,
  and project = ../employee for compile-time shapes -- the connect
  section's name is the code's namespace (employee.Employee)
- fingerprints are PASTE-HERE placeholders by design: keys generate
  into WO_DATA at first boot (9d), tomls carry fingerprints only,
  printed by --identity
- sample-first: compiles after 9/9b/9c/9d; README maps each mode to
  the acceptance line it exists for; 9c/9d stories now name this
  sample as their workload

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-15 12:34:19 +02:00

2.3 KiB

employee-list — program B: attach, authenticate, read

Status: target workload — does not compile on today's toolchain. Written ahead of iterations 9c (cross-program tables) and 9d (keypair attach auth), the way every acceptance sample here precedes its features. It also leans on 9/9b (the employee sample it attaches to must run first).

Two programs, one database, one writer:

employee (A)                          employee-list (B)
  owns WO_DATA + WAL                    no database of its own
  [share] listen = unix:...sock         [connect.employee] ipc = unix:...sock
  [[share.clients]]                     public_key = <A's fingerprint, pinned>
    public_key = <B's fingerprint>      project    = ../employee  (shapes)
    rights     = "read"
        ▲                                     │
        └── every statement executes here ◄───┘   (typed, over the wire)

The manifests are the design: A grants, B pins. A's [share] names B's public-key fingerprint with rights (read here); B's [connect.employee] names A's IPC string AND A's fingerprint, so neither side talks to an impostor. Fingerprints are printed by each program's --identity after first boot (keys are generated into WO_DATA, never written into a toml) and pasted — the PASTE-…-HERE placeholders mark exactly where. The connect-section name is the code's namespace: [connect.employee] is why the source says employee.Employee.

Mode What it proves
employee-list list typed reads over the wire, e.dept.name ref navigation executing inside A
employee-list report byte-identical output to A's own report — attach + GroupBy compose, the wire changes nothing
employee-list staff <dept> unique-name index probe + staff backlink scan, both in A
employee-list probe-write the rights matrix: registered read-only, so the insert traps with access-denied (caught, DENIED …, exit 4) and A's row count is unchanged

The 9d acceptance drives the rest from the outside: wrong key, no key, same-uid-wrong-key, impostor socket, handshake replay, key rotation — see the iteration's criteria; this sample is the workload they run against.