writeonce/docs/examples/employee-list/README.md
shoney.arickathil c0b0dbb846 docs: audit all markdown against the code, fix findings, flatten status folders
- README: shipped concurrency/HTTP/WebSockets sat in the roadmap as "not yet
  available"; "no package manager" contradicted [deps]; the deps example
  would not have compiled (the key IS the module name)
- runtime/README: leads with wovm, wo-rt.c demoted to a historical section;
  dropped 2 nonexistent recipes, crates/rt, @gc refcounting, 13 suites -> 18
- employee + log-watcher READMEs claimed "does not compile"; both are gates
- error catalog: +10 emitted codes incl WO-E250, the only diagnostic the
  shipped query surface raises; recorded why the sweep rotted
- language-surface: group-by parses, then the typechecker refuses it
- 00-code-review + 00-link-audit re-run; history kept, not rewritten
- 48 dead Rust-era exploration links de-linked rather than re-pointed (their
  prose names the retired plan by number); successor map -> discarded.md
- 08-project-structure: compiler/plan/ never existed; corpus has 9 dirs, 5 empty
- releasing.md: dropped a --draft step the workflow never had
- new docs/00-doc-audit.md: findings + disposition, incl one row where the
  audit was wrong and the doc it accused was right
- status folders removed: 34 stories flat, status only in frontmatter; 252
  links recomputed from resolved paths; board/board-views/structure retaught
- story 24 -> in-progress, since frontmatter is now the only truth
- new iteration 38: fs mutation verbs + net.connect, the two capability
  families no iteration owned
- new iteration 39: gofiber/fiber v3.5.0 parity study. The ledger called
  CSRF/sessions unblocked by iteration 34's HMAC, but the runtime has no
  source of randomness at all
- linkcheck skips .dev/.superpowers: 0 broken paths, 0 bad anchors

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 19:20:22 +02:00

2.3 KiB

employee-list — program B: attach, authenticate, read

Status: target workload — does not compile on today's toolchain. Written ahead of iterations 20 (cross-program tables) and 21 (keypair attach auth), the way every acceptance sample here precedes its features. It also leans on 9/9b (the employee sample it attaches to must run first).

Two programs, one database, one writer:

employee (A)                          employee-list (B)
  owns WO_DATA + WAL                    no database of its own
  [share] listen = unix:...sock         [connect.employee] ipc = unix:...sock
  [[share.clients]]                     public_key = <A's fingerprint, pinned>
    public_key = <B's fingerprint>      project    = ../employee  (shapes)
    rights     = "read"
        ▲                                     │
        └── every statement executes here ◄───┘   (typed, over the wire)

The manifests are the design: A grants, B pins. A's [share] names B's public-key fingerprint with rights (read here); B's [connect.employee] names A's IPC string AND A's fingerprint, so neither side talks to an impostor. Fingerprints are printed by each program's --identity after first boot (keys are generated into WO_DATA, never written into a toml) and pasted — the PASTE-…-HERE placeholders mark exactly where. The connect-section name is the code's namespace: [connect.employee] is why the source says employee.Employee.

Mode What it proves
employee-list list typed reads over the wire, e.dept.name ref navigation executing inside A
employee-list report byte-identical output to A's own report — attach + GroupBy compose, the wire changes nothing
employee-list staff <dept> unique-name index probe + staff backlink scan, both in A
employee-list probe-write the rights matrix: registered read-only, so the insert traps with access-denied (caught, DENIED …, exit 4) and A's row count is unchanged

The 21 acceptance drives the rest from the outside: wrong key, no key, same-uid-wrong-key, impostor socket, handshake replay, key rotation — see the iteration's criteria; this sample is the workload they run against.