writeonce/docs/stories/language-runtime-database/34-crypto-builtins.md
shoney.arickathil 62d29d6a77 docs(24): T10 closeout — stories done, board, graph, ledger, CODE-LOGIC
Iteration 24 closes, absorbing 31 and 34. No code in this commit.

- stories 24, 31, 34 -> `status: done`, each with a landing banner. 24's
  records the gate numbers and BOTH disclosed deviations: monitor takes
  three arguments (the caller may be `main`, which has no mailbox) and a
  v1 `call` reply is a typed scalar (which is what let the agreement be
  checked at compile time, WO-E226). 31's notes it landed INSIDE 24 and
  that a fifth mechanism it never anticipated came out of proving the
  gate — the drain guarantee (40). 34's names the gap it did NOT close:
  still no RNG, so CSRF/sessions stay blocked
- board: in-progress row cleared, marker doc deleted (convention), the
  standup entry in the six-question shape, chain note — next link is
  databasev2 4 (io_uring group-commit, chain 5)
- graph: PUBSUB2 (pub/sub + WebSockets, "rejected until here") -> done
- porch ledger: a WebSocket/pub-sub row added; the cancellation row now
  says what it actually waits on rather than repeating "the arc"; the
  README's "no WebSockets/SSE" limitation was stale — WebSockets are
  supported, SSE and chunked encoding are not
- CODE-LOGIC: runtime/src gains the actor-lifecycle section (call, death,
  the cap counter's sender/home-thread split, the monitor walk, the timer
  list), the drain guarantee, and the digest section; docs/examples/chat
  gains its own — actor topology, WHY two actors per connection, fd
  ownership, and the shutdown choreography

Battery after the doc edits: wovm-test 36 suites 0 fail, woc-test exit 0,
oop-e2e 119/0, chat 11/0, web-app 46/0, linkcheck clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-28 00:06:31 +02:00

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---
iteration: "34"
status: done
---
# Iteration 34 — crypto builtins: digests and HMAC in the runtime
> Format: `product/story-iteration-template`. Part of
> [Story — one language, one runtime, one database, one binary](00-story.md).
>
> **Inserted 2026-08-22** — the framework ledger's oldest unowned gap
> gets an owner. PREMISE UPDATE (same day, post-merge): iteration 36
> landed bitwise `& | ^ << >>` + hex literals, so digests ARE now
> expressible in pure `.wo` — the original "no bitwise" impossibility
> is gone. The fork is now a real choice for this story's brainstorm:
> hand-rolled C builtins (bounded, fast, libc-only doctrine permits) vs
> pure-`.wo` (no runtime surface growth; interpreter-speed hashing).
> Off the concurrency chain but **gates chain position 4**: iteration
> 24's WebSocket handshake needs SHA-1 before chat can land.
> **✅ LANDED 2026-08-27 — inside [24](24-chat-websocket-workload.md)** as its
> task 1. The fork resolved to **C builtins**: `sha1` (85), `sha256` (86),
> `hmac_sha256` (87), each over one buffer returning a fresh `Bytes`. Pinned to
> the published vectors — RFC 3174, the SHA-256 vectors, RFC 4231 — in
> `runtime/test/test_crypto.c`, 18 checks, plus a corpus fixture hashing "abc"
> from `.wo`. This unblocked chain position 4: the WebSocket handshake needs
> SHA-1, and `just chat` verifies the accept-key independently.
>
> **The gap it did NOT close:** there is still no RNG in the runtime. HMAC
> authenticates a token and cannot mint one, so CSRF and sessions stay blocked
> — which is why [39](39-web-framework-parity.md) leads with a random-bytes
> builtin rather than treating them as unblocked.
## Why this iteration exists
Four consumers already wait on it, none able to proceed:
[iteration 24](24-chat-websocket-workload.md)'s upgrade handshake
(`Sec-WebSocket-Accept` = base64(SHA-1(key + GUID)) — SHA-1
specifically, not a choice); the framework's ETag/conditional-request
row (wants a content hash); HMAC-signed tokens the auth core can grow;
and held [databasev2 10](../databasev2/10-keypair-attach-auth.md), whose
challenge–response needs primitives that "do not exist" (its demotion
note). Bytes and base64 landed with iteration 19 — the carriers exist,
only the digests are missing.
## Goals
- **Digest builtins over Bytes**: SHA-1 (the WS handshake's hard
requirement), SHA-256 (the modern default for ETag/HMAC), each
`Bytes -> Bytes`, streaming not required (whole-value, like every
existing builtin).
- **HMAC-SHA256** (`key: Bytes, msg: Bytes -> Bytes`) — the one
composition real services need (signed tokens, webhook signatures);
expressible in `.wo` since iteration 36's bitwise set — C-builtin vs
pure-`.wo` is this story's brainstorm call.
- **Test vectors are the acceptance**: FIPS 180 / RFC 2202 / RFC 4231
vectors in a corpus fixture — a digest that "looks right" is worth
nothing.
- **The contract doc row**: names, arities, Bytes-in/Bytes-out, and the
explicit note that SHA-1 exists for protocol compatibility (WS), not
for new designs.
## Acceptance Criteria (draft — the spec refines)
- **Given** the published test vectors for SHA-1, SHA-256, and
HMAC-SHA256, **when** the corpus fixture runs them through the
builtins, **then** every output matches byte-for-byte (via the
existing base64/Bytes surface).
- **Given** the WS handshake's worked example from RFC 6455
(`dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==` → `s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo=`),
**when** composed in pure `.wo` from `sha1` + `base64_encode`,
**then** the exact accept token comes out — iteration 24's handshake
is provably one expression away.
- **Given** the full battery, **when** it runs, **then** nothing
regresses — new builtin ids only, no opcode, no `.wob` version bump
(the iteration-19/`time.ticks` precedent).
## Out Of Scope
- Asymmetric crypto (ed25519 signatures/keypairs) — held iteration 21's
spec decides what it needs when it unholds; this iteration lays the
digest floor it will stand on.
- TLS — permanently the proxy's job (framework doctrine).
- CRC32 — the ledger lists it, but no consumer is blocked on it; it
joins only if 24's spec finds a real need (rejecting speculative
surface).
- A password-hashing story (bcrypt/argon2) — no workload asks yet.
- Bitwise operators in the language — a separate, bigger surface
decision this iteration deliberately routes around.
## Info
Forks the spec must settle:
1. **The namespace.** The reserved stdlib namespaces are exactly
`fs`/`proc`/`net`/`time`/`json`/`env` (compiler-enforced list) — a
new `crypto` namespace touches that list plus the typechecker
table, or the functions ride an existing namespace. Leaning: a real
`crypto` namespace (the list exists to be grown deliberately; this
is deliberate).
2. **Surface shape**: `crypto.sha1(b: Bytes) -> Bytes`,
`crypto.sha256(b: Bytes) -> Bytes`,
`crypto.hmac_sha256(key: Bytes, msg: Bytes) -> Bytes` — Text
convenience overloads rejected (the caller has `bytes_of_text`).
3. **Implementation source**: hand-rolled C from the FIPS pseudocode
(~200 lines for both digests; well-trodden, vector-verified) — the
doctrine's shape. No linking against OpenSSL, ever.
4. **Where the code lives**: `runtime/src/crypto.c` beside sysio, or
inside builtin.c — file layout, the executor decides.
## Proposed Solution
Brainstorm → (small) spec settling the four forks → implement with the
`time.ticks` slice's shape (ids, one table row per compiler surface,
contract-doc rows, vector fixtures). Lands any time before iteration
24's spec; independent of 31/22/23.