- docs/stories/databasev2/, numbered from 1. Six PENDING database iterations
moved from the language track and renumbered, keeping the old id in
`was_language_iteration:` so a search for "iteration 32" still finds it:
32 -> 3 WAL checkpoint, 23 -> 4 io_uring commit, 33 -> 7 single-file store,
27 -> 8 query grammar, 20 -> 9 cross-program, 21 -> 10 keypair auth.
Done work (9, 9b, 22) stays as v1 history; language 18 left whole
- the problem, read off the engine not guessed: rows are malloc'd slabs with
addresses stable forever, NO eviction/spill/paging anywhere in database/src,
the WAL never checkpoints so boot replays all history, and durability is one
process-global WO_DATA so no table can say it matters more than another.
An allocation failure IS a clean catchable WO_T_OOM — but swap thrash
arrives first and carries no error signal at all, which is the real hazard
- four new iterations:
1 measure the ceiling FIRST (curve not cliff; the three exits; kill -9 at
exhaustion) — every later default should follow from a number
2 `@table(mode: ram | durable | cold)` — the grammar ask. Small surface
(Ast.table_cfg gains a key, the parser already rejects unknown args), big
semantics: `durable` defaults so nothing changes silently, and the
compiler refuses a durable row holding a `ref` into a ram table
5 bounded tables + refuse/evict/back-pressure, shedding BEFORE the OS acts
6 cold tiering — mostly forks, incl. whether the language surfaces the
fault cost and whether @unique on cold is refused outright. A paged
B-tree stays rejected: if tiering needs one, reject tiering
- 39 links repointed, link TEXT renumbered to track-local ids; arc gains one
pointer row replacing the six moved; board + board-views cover three tracks
- linkcheck 0 broken / 0 anchors; no code blocks in any story
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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7.5 KiB
| track | iteration | status |
|---|---|---|
| porch | 1 | refine |
porch 1 — store-backed middleware: rate limiting and idempotency
Part of Story —
porch, the writeonce web framework. Source: the Fiber parity study §2.First deliberately because it is the cheapest. Both features need only a
@tableandtime.ticks, both of which already exist — no new builtin, no cookie, no change toResp. It exists to prove the store pattern and the gate shape on low-risk work before iterations 2–4 touch the runtime and the public response type.
Goals
- A rate limiter that survives a restart. Fixed-window counting keyed by
client, answering 429 with the conventional headers when the window is spent.
Fiber's
limiterkeeps counters in memory by default and expects Redis for anything real; porch's live in a@table, so they are WAL-durable and crash-recoverable for free. That is the difference worth demonstrating, and it is why the acceptance criteria include a restart. - Idempotent replay of unsafe requests. A client resending a POST with the same idempotency key gets the stored response and the handler does not run twice. This is the correctness feature the storefront sample has silently needed since it grew a checkout.
- Establish the store convention for iterations 2–4. Sessions and CSRF will want the same shape. Decide it once, here, on the cheap slice.
Phases
Phase A — the store convention
- Decide the store shape (see Info fork 1) and write it down before any middleware exists, because three later iterations inherit it.
- Add the
@tableclasses for a counter row and a stored-response row, with the secondary indexes their lookups need — the read path is an equality probe, which is the only index shape the engine has. - Decide and document the expiry discipline: rows are pruned lazily on access, not by a background sweeper, because porch has no timer and iteration 30 owns scheduled work.
- Verify:
woc docs/examples/porch/typechecks entry-less as a library; the new tables appear in the WAL and replay across a restart.
Phase B — the rate limiter
- A
Limitermiddleware class with abeforethat counts and either passes or short-circuits with 429 — the?Respshort-circuit the chain already has. - Key selection: reuse
client_ip(req)and the existing trusted-proxy judgement rather than inventing a second one. A keyed-by-principal variant falls out for free oncereq.principalis set by an auth middleware. - The response headers on both paths, and a
Retry-Afteron the refusal. - Window arithmetic on
time.ticks(µs monotonic), nottime.now— a wall-clock jump must not hand out a free window. - Verify: a burst crosses the threshold at exactly N, the window rolls, the
counters survive
SIGTERM+ restart.
Phase C — idempotency
- An
Idempotentmiddleware pair:beforelooks the key up and replays a hit;afterstores the response for a miss. This is the first real user of theafterchain for something other than headers, which is worth noting. - Decide what is part of the identity: the key header alone, or key plus a
digest of method+path+body (
sha256exists). Replaying a stored response for a different body under a reused key is the failure mode that matters. - In-flight collision handling: a second request arriving while the first is still running. Fiber takes a lock; porch's shard model means the honest answer is probably to refuse with 409 rather than to block.
- Verify: replay returns the stored response, the handler's side effect happens exactly once, a reused key with a different body is refused, concurrent duplicates do not both execute.
Phase D — the gate and the ledger
- Extend
scripts/web-app-accept.shwith the checks above, including the restart leg — a durability claim that no gate exercises is not a claim. - Update porch's README ledger rows for both features, and record in the status board what landed versus what was planned.
- Verify:
just web-appandjust siteboth green;just linkcheckclean.
Acceptance Criteria
- Given a limiter of N requests per window, when a client sends N+1,
then the first N succeed and the last is 429 with
Retry-Afterset. - Given counters at their limit, when the process is SIGTERMed and restarted, then the client is still limited — the counters replayed from the WAL rather than resetting to zero.
- Given a window that has fully elapsed, when the same client returns, then it is served, and the expired row is pruned on that access.
- Given the system clock jumping backwards, when the window is
evaluated, then no extra allowance is granted (
time.ticksis monotonic). - Given a POST with an idempotency key that has been seen, when it is replayed, then the stored response is returned byte-identically and the handler's side effect count is unchanged — proven by a row count, not by a log line.
- Given a reused idempotency key with a different request body, when it arrives, then it is refused rather than answered with the other request's response.
- Given two identical keyed requests in flight at once, when both are dispatched, then exactly one executes and the other gets the decided answer (replay or 409), never a partial write.
Out Of Scope
- A pluggable
Storageinterface. Fiber abstracts it so one middleware runs on memory or Redis. porch has one store, and interfaces here are structural — an abstraction with exactly one implementor is decoration, which iteration 37 learned the hard way aboutComponent. Concrete@tableuntil a second backend actually exists. - Sliding-window or token-bucket algorithms. Fixed window is what the sample needs; a better algorithm is a later slice with a measurement behind it.
- Distributed limiting across processes. One program owns its database; cross-program state is language databasev2 9.
- A background expiry sweeper. No timer exists (
time.afteris still a reserved builtin id inwob.h). Lazy pruning on access, deliberately. - The TTL cache middleware — language iteration 18 owns it, spec already approved. Do not build a second cache here.
Info
Forks the spec must settle:
- One store or two? A single generic key/value/expiry table serving both
features, or a purpose-shaped table each. Leaning two: the columns genuinely
differ (a counter is an Int, a stored response is status + headers + body),
and a generic table would force everything through
Text, which is how the framework's cache ended up storing JSON strings. - What is the limiter's key when there is no auth?
client_ip(req)readsX-Forwarded-For, which a direct client can forge. Behind the mandated TLS proxy that is fine; on an open port it is not.net.peer(fd)gives the real peer — decide which is authoritative and reuse whatever the trusted-proxy slice concludes rather than deciding twice. - Does idempotency store headers? Fiber has
KeepResponseHeadersbecause replayingSet-Cookieor a freshDateis usually wrong. porch has no cookies yet (iteration 2), so this is cheap to decide now and expensive to retrofit later.
Nothing here needs a new runtime primitive, which is the point of going first.